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THE EXPERIENCE OF NOVELTY: ANOTHER DIMENSION TO SUBJECTIVE MEMORY  
EXPERIENCES? 
 
 Subjective experiences of memory (e.g., feelings of familiarity) have been a topic of 
much research. Though novelty might be considered a manifestation of memory (insofar as some 
form of memory for the past is required in order for n velty recognition or detection to occur), 
subjective experiences of novelty have largely been ignored in the current memory literature. 
The present study used a rating scale to measure the subjective feeling of novelty. One goal was 
to investigate potential mechanisms of feelings of novelty. Another was to determine how 
feelings of novelty relate to feelings of familiarity; for example, many models assume that 
novelty is simply the inverse of familiarity. Two experiments reported here examined if this 
presumed relationship between familiarity and novelty is an accurate assumption. In one 
experiment, subjects viewed words in a study list and then were tested on cues that potentially 
shared orthographic features with the study words while duration of cue-prime exposure and cue-
match-priming effects were observed. In another, subjects were tested after having repeated the 
test cues aloud either once or 30 times. Both experiments compared a familiarity rating scale 
with a novelty rating scale. No effects of duration of exposure (either through priming in 
Experiments 1 and 2 or repetitions in Experiment 3) were observed, helping to rule out several 
potential mechanisms of feelings of novelty. Differences in how familiarity ratings and novelty 
ratings responded to the experimental manipulations were found in both experiments, suggesting 
that the sense of novelty is not simply the inverse of familiarity.   
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 Throughout the span of human history our ability to survive has been dependent upon our 
capacity to adapt to our environment and respond to whatever situation we may be faced with. 
This ability translates into our ability to learn ad, in order to do this, we must be able to 
discriminate between those situations in which we alr ady have a pattern to drive our response 
and those situations which may be new, where no pattern exists. When we are faced with a 
situation that we have been in before, we can rely on our experiences of that past event to predict 
what that situation will entail and to employ the appropriate response patterns (See Glenberg, 
1997). We are motivated to learn in order to improve upon these predictions so that we can 
become more efficient and effective in our environme t. We seek out novel experiences to 
facilitate this learning. Though much research exists on the importance of novelty in learning and 
memory processes, little is known about the subjectiv  experience of novelty itself. A great deal 
of research exists on other subjective experiences of memory, such as tip-of-the-tongue-
experiences (e.g., see Schwartz, 2002, for a review), f elings of familiarity (e.g., Mandler, 2008; 
Yonelinas, 2002), feelings of knowing (e.g., Koriat & Leiblich, 1977), and even déjà vu 
experiences (e.g., Brown & Marsh, 2010; Cleary, 2008; Cleary, Ryals & Nomi, 2009; Cleary et 
al., 2012), but little is known about the subjective experience of novelty. The purpose of the 
present study is to examine several hypotheses related to the subjective experience of novelty.  
What is Novelty? 
 
 There is variability within the literature as to what actually constitutes novelty. While the 
most common use of the term may apply it to items or ituations that are completely new or 
never before seen, other definitions exist within different research paradigms. Four types of 
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novelty will be discussed below: stimulus novelty, contextual novelty, associative novelty and 
novelty as lack of earlier occurrence in a list. All of these types of novelty will be discussed in 
relation to the literature and throughout this paper.  
Novelty as Stimuli Never Before Seen  
Stimulus novelty refers to enhanced processing for new items compared to that elicited 
upon repetition of a stimulus. This is analogous to the idea of priming, where the presentation of 
a stimulus, such as a word, elicits different responses upon multiple presentations. Novelty can 
be thought of here as a characteristic of the stimulus itself by which there are differing degrees of 
novelty depending on the amount of prior exposure to that stimulus. This definition of novelty 
would encompass items or stimuli that have never ben s en before as well as those that have 
been seen but are relatively rare or uncommon occurrences (Ranganath & Rainer, 2003). 
Novelty as Stimuli Unexpected in a Given Context 
Contextual novelty refers to an event or stimulus occurring out of context or out of place 
(Ranganath & Rainer, 2003). An example of this could be a naked guy walking into a lecture hall 
for a class (this is an example from Ranganath and Rainer (2003) from UC Berkeley). This type 
of novelty would also include an item being moved from its original location – a manipulation 
which is often used in eye-tracking research. Contextual novelty spurs an orienting response by 
which attentional resources are automatically diverted to the unexpected or out-of-place stimulus 
(Ranganath & Rainer, 2003).  
Novelty as a Reconfiguration of Familiar Elements  
Associative novelty, as it is referred to, is the type of novelty that is induced when 
individual aspects of a scenario are familiar, however, the arrangement or relationship of them 
within a situation is new (Kumaran & Maguire, 2007; O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978). For instance, 
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O'Keefe and Nadel (1978) give the example: “the novelty of the wife in the best friend's 
bed lies neither in the wife, nor the friend, nor the bed, but in the unfamiliar conjunction of the 
three” (p. 241). The novel arrangement of familiar elements can present as a rearrangement in 
time (Honey et al., 1998; Kumaran & Maguire, 2007) or as a rearrangement in space (Kumaran 
& Maguire, 2007; O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978). Both of which, in animal work have shown to 
provoke an orienting response (Honey et al., 1998; Kumaran & Maguire, 2007; O'Keefe & 
Nadel, 1978).  
Novelty as Known Stimuli Unfamiliar From Lack of Presentation on an Earlier Study List  
An additional way to view novelty arises from memory research; particularly, as the 
inverse of familiarity when a task involves identifying items from a test list that had previously 
been presented on a study list (distinguishing old fr m new). Some stimuli are considered novel 
because their initial presentation is in a test phase and they were not present on a prior study list 
(although these stimuli may very well be known out f the experimental environment). This type 
of novelty is highly related to the others discussed above and may actually fit in to the 
associative novelty category; however, it is separated here due to its specific applicability in list-
learning paradigms. 
Special Treatment of Novel Stimuli 
 
 Novel stimuli never before seen from the environment are processed differently than 
stimuli one has already come in contact with. Evidence for this can be seen at a basic physical 
level as well as at broader, more cognitive levels. At a very basic, neuronal level, findings have 
revealed that neurons in the hippocampal and parahippocampal regions, regions important for 
memory, show an increase in firing patterns for novel stimuli as opposed to stimuli that have 
previously been encountered (Kumaran & Maguire, 2007; Viskontas, Knowlton, Steinmetz, & 
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Fried, 2006). These neurons decrease firing (or are acted upon by inhibitory neurons) as early as 
the second exposure to the stimulus (Viskontas, Knowlton, Steinmetz, & Fried, 2006). It is this 
difference in response even at this basic level to the repetition of stimuli that is integral in the 
explanation of stimulus novelty explained above (in 'Novelty as stimuli never before seen' 
section) (Ranganath & Rainer, 2003). The differential behavior of these neurons in response to 
novelty implicates the hippocampus and parahippocampal regions as taking on a role of novelty 
detector, comparing present experience to memory repres ntations to detect if something is new 
(Gray, 2000; Kumaran & Maguire, 2007). This is consistent with animal studies that have looked 
into the brain regions involved in maintenance of familiar and novel stimuli and suggestions that 
prefrontal regions may be important for handling and matching familiar stimuli while medial 
temporal regions may be responsible for handling the novel stimuli (Stern, Sherman, Kirchoff, & 
Hasselmo, 2001).  
   In addition, research investigating neurochemical responses to novel stimuli during 
learning has shown that dopaminergic circuitry is involved in attendance to and processing of 
novel stimuli.  Dopamine cells have been found to play a large role in motivation and reward 
and, accordingly, are implicated in learning. While dopamine cells have been observed to fire in 
response to stimuli where reward is expected, dopamine cells have also been observed to fire in 
response to novel stimuli. These novel stimuli may not be, and most often are not, predictive of 
reward (Bunzeck et al., 2009; Kakade & Dayan, 2002). A few theories for why the dopaminergic 
system would attend to novelty have been proposed. For one, novelty may be rewarding in itself. 
If we think back to an adaptive strategy, this makes s nse; finding and exploring novel 
information allows us the opportunity to learn. An alternate idea is that this system is involved in 
novelty detection because its job is to evaluate situations for potential reward. If a situation is 
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novel, its possible pairing with reward is still unknown, in which case it would be maintained in 
working memory until evaluation of this relationship can take place (Bunzeck, et al., 2009; 
Kakade & Dayan, 2002).   
 Overall, the dopaminergic system may be involved in or enting us to novel stimuli and, in 
turn, in motivating behavior in response to that stimulus. For instance, the dopamine system of a 
rat may be involved in detecting a novel environment and, upon this detection, the rat may then 
be oriented to that environment (via dopamine release in the striatum) and then engage in 
exploratory behavior (Bunzeck, et al., 2009; Kakade & Dayan, 2002). These responses are 
assumed to be automatic or mechanical. In the same manner that the dopaminergic system would 
respond to reward, dopamine is released in the striatum, which is then able to initiate a course of 
action as a response. Therefore, novel stimuli are abl  to capture our attention and influence the 
way we make decisions (Bunzeck, et al., 2009; Kakade & Dayan, 2002). 
 Further research into the neurotransmitter correlates of memory paradigms concerned 
with familiar and novel stimuli has found a difference in hippocampal glutamate efflux for the 
two types of stimuli as well (Ranganath & Rainer, 2003; Stanley, Wilson, & Fadel, 2012). In 
particular, glutamate efflux is heightened during exposure to novel stimuli whereas this is not 
above baseline during exposure to familiar stimuli. In this research, rats were presented with both 
familiar and novel objects in an exploratory environment while hippocampal acetylcholine 
(ACh), glutamate, and GABA efflux were measured through in vivo microdialysis. According to 
behavioral observations, the animals more often oriented toward the novel object in their 
exploratory behavior over the familiar object. In any case of exploration (familiar object or novel 
object), this exploration was paired with an increase in hippocampal ACh efflux, and no changes 
in GABA efflux. This research implicates glutamate s having particular involvement in novelty 
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recognition (Stanley, Wilson, & Fadel, 2012). However, other studies have found indications that 
Ach as well can have a differential reaction to novel stimuli and have suggested that it may be 
instrumental in the encoding process via its involvement with NMDA receptors during long term 
potentiation and its role in elevating neuronal activity in response to stimuli in various regions of 
the brain (Ranganath & Rainer, 2003; Stanley, Wilson, & Fadel, 2012). All of these studies 
suggest different mechanisms involved in processing novel and familiar stimuli. 
 Associative novelty detection has also been more specifically linked to the hippocampus. 
Hippocampal neurons are said to be integral in forming a cognitive map, where associations 
between activity of these neurons concerned with space (place cells, head direction cells, grid 
cells, etc.) are integrated with proprioceptive ande vironmental cues (Buzsaki, 2006). To form a 
cognitive map, associations must be made between stimuli and context (O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978). 
Cues present in the environment that are contrary to an established association will result in 
association novelty and a novelty response. This can be observed in studies of rats in a Morris 
water maze. When the escape platform is moved to a new location after past trials of the platform 
in one location, the firing rate of hippocampal neurons increases (O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978). 
 Similarly, a study that explored these concepts of associative novelty in humans using 
fMRI discovered a novelty response demonstrated by increased activity in the parahippocampal 
region during an associative recognition memory task (Duzel et al., 2003). The researchers had 
participants engage in a task that involved them learning associations between pairs of stimuli 
presented on a screen. They were then tested on these learned associations in a recognition 
memory test either based on the spatial arrangement of the items presented or the identity of the 
items presented. Brain activity within parahippocamp l regions was dissociated between these 
different types of recognition judgments. Specifically, parahippocampal cortices were more active 
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for both types of recognition judgments when the stimuli were recognized as an old pair (versus a 
new pair of items). More activity was observed in the hippocampal formation, however, when 
novel pairs of stimuli were recognized. More activity was also observed in this area when the 
recognition judgment had to be made based on spatial arrangement (Duzel et al., 2003). These 
findings support a neural basis for novelty encoding a d suggest that different types of novelty 
might have different neural substrates. 
Novel Stimuli Capture Attention 
 
 One might be able to deduce from the neurological evidence that novel stimuli are 
processed differently cognitively as well. Indeed, behavioral paradigms have revealed that novel 
stimuli capture attention. One finding that has consistently been observed through eye-tracking 
experiments is that we tend to be drawn to novel stimuli and focus our gaze on these stimuli 
longer than familiar stimuli. This effect is seen across modalities or different types of stimuli. 
Althoff and Cohen (1999) reported it when they tracked the eye movements of subjects presented 
with famous and non-famous faces over the course of two sessions two weeks apart. They 
observed different patterns of eye movements dependent upon whether the face was famous 
(familiar) or non-famous (never before seen). Specifically, eye movements for non-famous faces 
had a more predictable and stable pattern than those for famous faces. This occurred regardless 
of the task that the participant was asked to carry out (whether it was to attend to 'famousness' of 
these faces or to the emotion expressed in these faces) (Althoff & Cohen, 1999).   
 An earlier study showed the same effect with faces and buildings. These researchers 
referred to this effect as the “eye-movement-based m mory effect” (Althoff & Cohen, 1999; 
Cohen et al., 1998). This effect is likely the result of an unconscious process since manipulation 
of the judgments to be made did not change whether there was this difference in pattern of eye 
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movements and fixations between faces the participants had previously been exposed to 
(famous) and those which were new or novel (non-famous). This effect occurred independently 
of recognition decisions. The eye-tracking results seem to result from a top-down process by 
which prior experience with stimuli shape the way information is processed (Althoff & Cohen, 
1999).   
 In an additional study investigating the eye-movement memory effect and unconscious 
processing of novel stimuli, Ryan, Althoff, Whitlow, and Cohen (2000) presented subjects with 
pictures of scenes. These scenes were presented in three different manners over the course of the 
experiment: once within the three blocks (novel scenes), once in each block of the experiment 
(repeated scenes), or once in each of the first two blocks in an original form and then presented 
again in the third block in an altered form, wherein an object was added to the photo, taken out, 
or shifted (these were referred to as 'manipulated sc nes' in the original paper). Subjects' eye 
movements were measured and compared across these conditions. The researchers were 
particularly interested in observing the number of fixations and the number of regions of the 
photograph sampled when photographs had been manipul ted as opposed to those when 
photographs belonged to the repeated or novel conditi s. Consistent with their earlier work 
(showing more eye movement and fixations to items semantically incongruent with their 
embedded scene), they observed a repetition effect by which fewer regions of the photograph 
were sampled and fewer fixations occurred when the photograph was repeated or manipulated as 
opposed to when the photograph was novel. Just as they had found with their face research, 
stimuli that were novel (both never before seen and contextual) received more sampling and 




Enhanced Memory for Novel Stimuli 
 
 Behavioral studies also suggest that novel stimuli are better remembered. Similar to the 
Von Restorff effect (also referred to as the isolati n effect), which shows better memory for 
items that are unusual or stand out in some way (Hunt, 1995; Von Restorff, 1933), a general 
consensus is that, not only do we attend to novel stimuli at a higher degree, but that we also tend 
to have better memory for these novel stimuli when tested on them later (Lubow & Moore, 1959; 
Wang & Mitchell, 2011). Various theories have set out t  explain why this is. Two of these 
theories that predominate the literature are: the atention-likelihood theory and the 
novelty/encoding hypothesis, both of which incorporate attention and memory (Diana & Reder, 
2006; Kim, Yi, Raye, & Johnson, 2012; Tulving & Kroll, 1995). 
 The attention-likelihood theory holds that novel it ms, or those that occur infrequently, 
and the features related to them receive more attention i  the encoding process and therefore 
have stronger tags in the memory trace that later provide an ease at retrieval. Basically, because 
of the attentional focus on novel items, they are consolidated more strongly (Diana & Reder, 
2006; Kim et al., 2012). Support for this theory exists in research that shows that source 
judgments for low frequency (novel) items are more accurate than those for high-frequency 
(familiar) items. This aligns with the idea that the features associated with novel stimuli, 
including context or source information will be more likely to be remembered than those 
associated with familiar items. This can also provide support for recognition research that shows 
that items presented more frequently coincide with a lower hit rate and a higher false alarm rate 
than novel items (Diana & Reder, 2006; Kim et al., 2012).  
 These research findings can also be examined throug  the similar perspective of a 
novelty/encoding explanation as put forth by Tulving and Kroll (1995). The idea behind this 
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theory is that neural networks assess incoming information for 'worthiness' for long-term storage 
whereby encoding depends upon the novelty of the information. This, again, can account for the 
finding that better memory is observed for novel itms (and the context that enshrouds them) 
than items that have been repeated (Kim et al., 2012; Tulving & Kroll, 1995). Because the 
hippocampus is a key player in memory encoding processes, this explanation also pairs nicely 
with the idea of novelty detection within our hippocampal circuitry (Gray, 2000; Viskontas et al., 
2006). 
 Diana and Reder (2006) investigated how the degree of novelty of an item could 
influence familiarity-based judgments and source/contextual information at both encoding and 
retrieval through the use of low and high frequency words (frequency determined by frequency 
of use within the language; ex: low frequency word – tribunal or aberrant, high frequency word – 
increased or earlier). They hypothesized that because novel information captures attention and 
requires deeper processing at encoding, recognition for i formation paired with the low 
frequency words at a study phase would be impaired when later tested on that information alone 
compared to that of information that was paired with the high frequency words in the initial 
phase. However, at the time of retrieval they suspected that among those that have been 
successfully encoded, low frequency words would be associated with more accurate source 
judgments or recollection of contextual details (they provided this by varying the background 
color of the slides the words were presented on). The idea here is that the low frequency words 
are more novel, and therefore, initially require more attention but are better encoded, whereas the 
high frequency words require fewer attentional resources at encoding but are not encoded as 
deeply. Their findings supported their predictions, suggesting increased processing of novel  
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stimuli at encoding and a retrieval advantage for these stimuli and contextual details associated 
with them at test (Diana & Reder, 2006).  
 In a study that sought to explore this idea further and tease apart the degree of familiarity 
or novelty and the methods by which the stimuli are presented in order to examine ability to 
discriminate between stimuli, Mundy, Honey and Dwyer (2007) presented subjects with four 
pairs of yearbook-type photographs of faces and asked them to make categorization decisions. 
These photographs were morphed in order to present subjects with very similar portrait 
photographs as a pair at different levels of discriminability and the presentation of these 
photographs was manipulated among these exposures. Types of presentations included, 
alternations of the photographs, interspersed among the other presented photos, and blocks, in 
which one photo was presented repeatedly, followed by the other. They found that preexposure 
overall facilitated the ability to discriminate between faces in the photographs. They also found 
that the alternated presentation of the photographs was beneficial to ability to discriminate 
between them (Mundy, Honey, & Dwyer, 2007). It is thought that alternating presentation 
between stimuli enhances attention to the unique or novel aspects of the photos, allowing better 
discriminability. Again, similar findings have been observed when stimuli are more abstract, 
such as screens of colored squares (Wang & Mitchell, 2011). These findings, similar to those of 
Ryan and colleagues (2000) and building upon work in attention, provide support again for a 
system designed to detect novelty or differences between incoming perceptual information and to 
remember them better. We are rapidly comparing incoming stream of stimuli in our environment 
to representations in our memory in order to discern old from new. From this derivative, we are 
able to determine how to respond to those stimuli.   
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Novelty in Recognition Memory Paradigms 
 Dual-process theories of recognition memory outline two distinct processes that are at 
play in recognition: recollection and familiarity. Recollection is defined as remembering or 
calling to mind the details of an event or stimulus, and familiarity is defined as the feeling that 
one has experienced something before (Cleary, 2004; Mandler, 2008; Yonelinas, 2002). Various 
dual process theories have been postulated since that original distinction was made.   
 Most dual process theories agree that familiarity is an initial subjective experience upon 
encountering some type of stimuli in which one feels as if he has experienced that stimulus 
before. It is generally thought to be a fast, almost automatic response, with no requirements of 
further retrieval or generation of contextual details. Recollection, on the other hand, does require 
this extended search (Mandler, 2008). This being said, these two concepts or dimensions of 
recognition are thought to occur in a time sequence, wh reby when encountering an event or 
stimulus, first a familiarity process based on perceptual input is instigated and then, if immediate 
recognition does not take place based on the intensity of the familiarity response, additional 
information about the target stimuli is sought out to provide details and identification of that 
target (Mandler, 2008). The second process would be the slower process of recollection. For 
instance, where subjects have been tasked with making decisions about items that had been 
previously studied and those that had not under time constraints, they were accurately able to 
make these distinctions (based on familiarity) faster than they could recollect details about the 
target stimuli or the context under which they were pr sented in (Hintzman & Curran, 1994; 
Yonelinas, 2002). Although there is a difference in pace of these processes, they are thought to 
be parallel processes, occurring in tandem (Mandler, 2008). In short, familiarity is the initial  
 
 13
experience of knowing one has experienced some event before and recollection is actively 
retrieving contextual details about that event or object (Mandler, 2008). 
 Many researchers who operate within the dual process framework have examined issues 
of subjective experience in recognition through their assessment of the familiarity response. The 
distinction between familiarity and recollection often entails a description of degree of access the 
individual has to aspects of his or her own memory. For example, in the remember-know 
paradigm, subjects are presented with test items, some of which appeared on an earlier study list. 
For each test item, subjects are asked to make an old-new recognition judgment followed by a 
self-assessment of the basis of that judgment. “Remember” responses mean the basis of that 
judgment was recollection; “Know” responses mean the basis was a mere feeling of familiarity 
(Cleary, 2004; Mandler, 2008; Tulving & Kroll, 1995; Yonelinas, 2002). 
 Other evidence supporting dual-process theory comes from research using what is called 
the recognition without cued recall (RWCR) paradigm (Cleary, 2004; Ryals & Cleary, 2012). In 
the RWCR paradigm subjects are presented with study words (ex: distraction) and are then 
presented with non-word test cues. Half of the non-w rd test cues are graphemically similar to 
study list items (ex: disfraption) and half are non-words with no resemblance to study items (ex: 
twilfight). At test, subjects are asked to rate the familiarity of the test cue or the likelihood that a 
similar word to the test cue appeared on the study list on a 0 to 10 scale (0=not familiar or no 
likelihood of previous presentation, and 10=very familiar or high likelihood of previous 
presentation). Subjects are also asked to identify the corresponding word from the study list (that 
resembles the test cue) if they are able to do so. Ryals and Cleary (2012) examined the RWCR 
effect and results of their study support the idea that overlap in specific features between the test 
item and the studied items can activate a familiarity response and that the strength of this 
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familiarity response can be mediated by the degree of f ature match; non-word test cues that 
more closely resembled study words were associated wi h higher familiarity ratings than non-
words with low resemblance (Ryals & Cleary, 2012). 
 Additionally, the study showed that recognition in the presence of cued recall and 
recognition without cued recall behave in very different ways. Factors that affect the presence 
and strength of familiarity ratings with cued recall success, such as the concreteness (vs. 
abstractness) of the word's semantic meaning, did not exhibit an effect on familiarity ratings in 
instances of cued recall failure. In the presence of r call, familiarity ratings are higher for 
concrete words than they are for abstract words, but when recall fails, the concreteness of the 
word makes relatively no difference on the familiarity atings for those words (Ryals & Cleary, 
2012). This supports the dual process perspective and suggests that different mechanisms may be 
at play in making the two different types of responses. While the recognition response in the 
presence of recall seems to be facilitated by (amount f) information that can be generated about 
the test cue, the recognition response when recall fails may be driven by (amount of) similarity 
of individual graphemic or orthographic features (Ryals & Cleary, 2012).    
 As discussed throughout this section, much research that has supported dual process 
theories in suggesting that there may be more than one process occurring in the workings of 
recognition memory. Others have examined how the subjective experiences of familiarity differ 
from recollection (e.g., remember-know studies). A question then arises as to whether there are 
only two processes involved in recognition. In these li t-learning paradigms, novelty is typically 
thought of as the polar opposite or inverse of famili rity on a spectrum and this relationship is 
represented in the literature as somewhat dichotomous; an item is either familiar or it is novel. 
This approach to novelty revisits the definition laid out earlier as 'novelty as known stimuli 
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unfamiliar due to lack of presentation on an earlier study list.' This concept of novelty permeates 
within the typical remember/know recognition paradigm; one must be able to distinguish 
between old and new in order to learn information and one must also be able to tell what is 'old' 
in order to make a 'new' judgment. Could novelty be another process at play in the mechanisms 
of recognition memory? How does this translate in terms of novel experiences?  
Subjective Experiences of Memory 
 Interest in subjective experiences of memory and in how these experiences map onto 
results of objective measures has begun to emerge within the research literature. Among some of 
the subjective phenomena that are described in the literature are feelings of familiarity (described 
in the previous section) (e.g., Mandler, 2008; Yonelinas, 2002), feelings of knowing (e.g., Koriat 
& Leiblich, 1977), tip-of-the-tongue-experiences (e.g., see Schwartz, 2002, for a review), and 
déjà vu experiences (e.g., Brown & Marsh, 2010; Cleary, 2008; Cleary, Ryals & Nomi, 2009; 
Cleary et al., 2012).   
 Feelings of knowing, or feelings about one's future ability to recognize an inaccessible 
target item if tested on it later, have been shown to be able to be influenced by manipulations of 
fluency of the cue although outcomes of objective recognition measures remain unchanged 
(Koriat, 2000; Koriat & Leiblich, 1977). The tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon, or the feeling that 
recall is imminent and that the memory for an item is on the verge of being accessed (although 
not accessible at that moment), has been explained s a metacognitive phenomenon possibly 
resulting from increased accessibility of information associated to the target leading to a inflated 
feeling of accessibility of the target itself (Schwartz, 1999; 2002).   
 Deja vu has been defined as the experience of having experienced something before 
while having a concurrent awareness that the situation is new. Researchers attribute this 
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subjective feeling to a high feeling of familiarity for an event paired with a failure to retrieve any 
contextual details of that event and evidence that the event could not have been experienced 
before  (Brown, 2004; Cleary, 2008; Cleary, Ryals, & Nomi, 2009). To investigate possible 
mechanisms at play in the experience of deja vu, Cleary and colleagues (2012) used virtual 
reality to manipulate scene presentations. At study, subjects were allowed to explore various 
rooms, each accompanied by a room title. At test, three types of scenes were then presented: the 
exact rooms that had been presented in the study phase, rooms that were novel but configurally 
similar to those presented in the study phase (for example, a room titled 'bowling alley' that 
would map on to a room that looked like a subway sttion in its configuration of elements in the 
room), and rooms that were novel and shared no configural details to study rooms. Subjects were 
asked to rate the familiarity of these test rooms and to also identify, if they could, a room from 
the study phase that was similar to the test room currently being presented. A recognition without 
cued recall effect was observed; subjects rated the rooms that were configurally similar to those 
they had been presented with during the study phase as more familiar even when they were 
unable to explicitly identify a room from the study phase that the current room resembled 
(Cleary et al., 2012).  
 Within the theory of familiarity, the more similar  cue is to the original presentation of 
the stimulus, the higher the familiarity signal and the more likely one is to feel deja vu or a high 
subjective feeling of familiarity (Cleary et al., 2012). Along these lines, the greater degree of 
configural similarity, the higher the familiarity ratings should be and the higher the likelihood of 
reporting deja vu. Speaking to this, the results of this experiment showed that when participants 
were exposed a second time to the exact room that they had seen in the study phase, yet failed to 
identify the room as 'old', the familiarity ratings and deja vu proportions were even higher than 
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they were for configurally similar rooms (Cleary et al., 2012). This impels a question: why did 
the subjects fail to recollect that they had actually been in that room before? It seems that the 
subjects are experiencing high familiarity for these rooms, due to their reported familiarity 
ratings, in tandem with a high sense that the room is new, as evidenced by their reporting the 
room as new in their recognition judgments. Can deja vu then be characterized by a high feeling 
of familiarity occurring simultaneously with a high feeling of novelty? If this is the case, the 
classic way of looking at novelty as on the opposite end of a familiarity spectrum may need to be 
rethought. If feelings of familiarity and feelings of novelty can occur in unison, perhaps 
familiarity and novelty are, rather, two separate dimensions. 
 According to the studies discussed above and other res arch on the topic, one could 
suppose that familiarity and recollection could exist on separate continuums and various levels of 
each could be experienced. However, with regard to novelty, is novelty just low on the 
continuum of each of these forms of recognition or is novelty on a continuum of its own?  
The Subjective Experience of Novelty 
  The present study is concerned with how novelty is experienced at a subjective level. 
Perhaps the best example of a subjective experience of novelty is what is known as the “jamais 
vu” experience. Jamais vu may be thought of as the opposite of deja vu, described as a jarring 
feeling of novelty in a situation that one knows should be familiar (Brown, 2004; Brown & 
Marsh, 2010; Cleary, 2008; Read, Vokey, & Davidson, 1991). That is, while deja vu is the 
subjective feeling of familiarity during expected novelty, jamais vu is the subjective feeling of 
novelty under circumstances of expected familiarity (Brown, 2004; Brown & Marsh, 2010; 
Cleary, 2008; Read, Vokey, & Davidson, 1991). This simultaneous feeling of unfamiliarity and 
familiarity is a relatively rare experience compared to that of some of the other phenomena 
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discussed, yet it has been recorded with more frequency in a subset of individuals with temporal 
lobe epilepsy just before the onset of an epileptic se zure (Lardreau, 2011; O'Connor et al., 2010; 
O'Connor & Moulin, 2010). The mechanisms behind this phenomenon are unknown, however, 
some have suspected that the same factors involved in creating some of the other subjective 
memory experiences are the root cause here as well (Brown, 2004; Brown & Marsh, 2010; 
Cleary, 2008; Read, Vokey, & Davidson, 1991).   
 The Capgras delusion may be another example of a subjective experience of novelty. This 
is a delusion that has been observed among people with organic brain disorders in which a 
person will be able to recognize people close to them (such as friends or family members or even 
pets) as looking like those people (and having the same mannerisms, etc.), but will be convinced 
that these people are impostors. Interestingly, the delusion does not arise if the person is 
presented with only auditory information, such as when talking to their loved one on the phone 
(Brown, 2004; Ellis, Young, Quayle, & de Pauw, 1997). Some theories as to the etiology of this 
disorder have proposed that the limbic centers that bind emotion to memories (or emotion 
evaluation areas; amygdala) have been detached in some way from the visual representations of 
the memories (or visual recognition areas; fusiform gyrus) in these cases (Ellis, Young, Quayle, 
& de Pauw, 1997; Ramachandran, 2004). This explanation has been supported by research that 
has shown no difference in autonomic response to familiar versus unfamiliar faces among those 
diagnosed with Capgras, whereas a more pronounced autonomic orienting response is observed 
for familiar faces than for unfamiliar faces within a group of healthy controls and when auditory 
stimuli is used (familiar vs unfamiliar voices) among those diagnosed with the disorder (Ellis, 
Young, Quayle, & de Pauw, 1997; Ramachandran, 2004). 
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A more common experience of novelty may be found in relationship to reading language. A 
Google search of  “staring at a word too long” turns out numerous results (Google responds  
“about 50,400,000”). Many of these describe the sensation of having a word lose its meaning or 
feel foreign, or even of the word no longer seeming like a word after it is repeated somehow 
(usually read over and over or written over and over). They also usually include inquiries as to 
what this experience is called and whether others are experiencing it as well. Here are a couple 
examples from the first few search results: 
(Perhaps this only happens to me, but I doubt it.) 
Sometimes after looking at a word for a while, I become convinced that it can't 
possibly be spelled correctly. Even after looking it up, sounding it out, and 
realizing that there's simply no other way to spell the word, it still looks wrong.  
Is there a shorthand way to describe this feeling so that people will know what I 




If you say a certain word enough times, it starts to ound/feel different. I had this 
today with the word patio, and in the end I felt like I barely know the word 
anymore.  
I am not sure how else to describe this, but that’s pretty much the reason I’m 




 Can these case study and anecdotal reports of experi nc s described above be attributed 
to merely a very low subjective feeling of familiarity or is the feeling of a 'novel' experience 
important and separate? Is it possible to simultaneously have both the subjective feeling of 
familiarity and the subjective feeling of novelty as in deja vu? While these examples of 
subjective experiences of novelty exist anecdotally, few studies have actually DIRECTLY 
examined the subjective experience of novelty. However, some literatures may be particularly 
relevant to the question of how novelty is subjectively experienced.   
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Potential Mechanisms of the Subjective Experience of Novelty 
Semantic Satiation as a Potential Mechanism of Subjective Experiences of Novelty  
The experience of novelty alongside the experience of familiarity has been likened to 
descriptions of “word blindness” and semantic satiation (See Brown, 2004, p. 109). Semantic 
satiation is one term that has been used to describ the habituation that can occur from repeated 
exposure to the same stimuli. Neely (1977a; 1977b) used a standard semantic priming procedure 
to examine satiation. What is observed in this standard paradigm is that the speed of lexical 
decisions (deciding whether the word presented was a word or a non-word) is modulated by the 
semantic relatedness of words presented during priming; when a prime word has semantic 
association to the target, the decision is made fast r. Priming is therefore effective not just for 
visual features of words, but for semantic associations as well. The presentation of a prime word 
activates memory representations of that word along with sources and associations related to that 
word, which, in turn, leads to a faster response whn t e prime is semantically related to the 
target word. Whereas some activation of the representation from priming should lead to 
increased accessibility, Neely was interested in whether there could be too much activation, 
leading to over-saturation of the representation and decreased accessibility of the target. 
 Neely (1977a; 1977b) posited that extended repetition of the prime should result in 
semantic satiation, similar to a habituation respone for the prime. That is, he expected to reverse 
the effects seen in the lexical decision task so that words presented with prolonged repetition of a 
prime would actually result in a longer time to make a decision than words which had been 
primed with fewer repetitions. His observations of this task when manipulating duration of 
repetitions of the prime word did not match his expectations in this lexical task (Neely 1977a, 
1977b). However, this predicted reversal of priming effects was observed in an alternate 
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experiment carried out by Smith and Klein (1990) when subjects were tasked with making a 
semantic decision. This consisted of subjects being presented with a category title that they either 
had to say aloud three times or thirty times. They w re then presented with a target word and 
asked to make a decision about whether the target word as a member of the category that they 
had just been repeating. Decision times were significantly longer when the target word was 
actually a member of that category than when the targe  word did not belong to the category that 
had been repeated. Decision times were also slower f r the category titles that the participants 
repeated thirty times versus those they repeated thr e imes. This suggests that extended 
repetition of a prime can decrease access to semantic information related to that prime, consistent 
with the semantic satiation hypothesis (Smith & Klein, 1990). 
 Smith and Klein (1990) refer to semantic satiation as “the subjective experience of loss of 
meaning of a word as a result of prolonged inspection and repetition of that word” (p. 852) and 
note what it is like to experience this effect first hand. They describe accounts of feelings that the 
stimuli have lost meaning and familiarity as well as the inability to recognize the stimulus for 
what it is from physical or phonetic features. For instance, if the stimulus is a word, the word no 
longer looks like or sounds like a word (although, according to Neely's research, the knowledge 
that the stimulus is actually a word does not diminsh) (Smith & Klein, 1990). 
 A further study that attempted to explore semantic satiation as a potential mechanism 
involved in jamais vu was carried out by Chris Moulin's group at the University of Leeds and 
was described in a presentation at the Fourth Interna ional Conference on Memory held in 
Sydney, Australia in 2006 (as described in ABC Scien e Online; Skatssoon, 2006). Ninety-two 
subjects were asked to write out frequently used words, such as “door,” 30 times each for 60 
seconds and were then asked to describe their experi nc s of this task. Sixty-eight percent of 
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these subjects wrote descriptions that were categorized as mirroring the jamais vu phenomenon. 
For example, some subjects gave accounts like, “it looked like I was spelling something else”, it 
“sounded like a made-up word” or “I began to doubt that I was writing the correct word for the 
meaning” after repeatedly writing these words  (Skatssoon, 2006). These responses to this task 
are similar to what people describe experiencing after staring to a word too long with both lexical 
and semantic associations more difficult to access after repeated exposure to the word and hints 
at how the subjective experience of novelty may be manipulated. 
Semantic Satiation and the Jacoby-Whitehouse Effect 
In research that investigated conscious awareness of priming and the effect of priming on 
recognition and familiarity, Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989) found that priming, or providing a 
matching 'context' word, below the level of conscious awareness (flashed for only 50ms) just 
prior to a test word led to an increased level of false recognition for the test word (claiming that 
this word had been on an initial phase study list). Test words were medium-frequency five-letter 
nouns and the conditions of context words in this task were context words that matched the test 
word that would follow, context words that did not match the test word, and no context words. 
As in other priming and recognition memory paradigms, for the test list Jacoby and Whitehouse 
also used both old words, or words that had appeared on an earlier study list, and new words, or 
words that had not been presented earlier within the experiment. Their findings that the matching 
prime increased false alarms in recognition judgments is explained by the authors as being due to 
an increased familiarity signal as a direct effect of the flashing of the context word which is 
misattributed to the likelihood that the word had been presented on the study list. Interestingly, 
this effect is reversed when the subjects were made aware of the context words, or when the 
presence of these words was brought to conscious attention through a longer prime duration 
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(e.g., 200ms); less false recognition takes place in this circumstance. This also adheres to the 
authors' theory in that, once subjects are made aware th t these context words are flashing prior 
to the presentation of the test words, they are no lo ger prone to falsely attribute the increased 
feeling of familiarity to the word having been presented on the study list. Instead, they realize 
that the feeling of familiarity may arise due to the presentation of the context word at test. Jacoby 
and Whitehouse (1989) hold that these effects are due to the differences in familiarity and 
recollection and the degree of reliance on the famili rity signal rather than priming and an 
increase in perceptual fluency. 
 More recent work by Huber and colleagues (2008) suggests that the Jacoby-Whitehouse 
paradigm can be used to induce something similar to semantic satiation, and that this in turn, 
may relate to experiences of novelty (defined as unfamiliarity). In the model suggested by this 
group, the perceptual fluency-disfluency model, priming and perceptual fluency have a bell-
shaped relationship such that short duration of priming will increase perceptual fluency (as is 
suggested in the Jacoby-Whitehouse effect) to an extent, from which point, longer durations of 
priming will create disfluency. Perceptual fluency is the idea that previous experience or 
knowledge of a stimulus increases ease and, consequently, speed of processing. The model 
includes a structure that includes a perceptual level, an orthographic level, a lexical/semantic 
level, and a familiarity level, each previous level feeding into the next and can affect processing 
of the stimuli (See Figure 1). According to Huber et al.'s model, both perceptual fluency and 
familiarity for primed targets are amplified through short prime durations, whereas habituation is 
facilitated through long prime durations, resulting  perceptual disfluency and  depressed 
familiarity. They also propose variability in the dgree of priming it would take to result in 
disfluency. Negative priming or disfluency is acquired more rapidly for more familiar items; they 
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activate more quickly and, in turn, habituate more quickly. Therefore, difference in length of 
prime duration required to reach a point of disfluency differs according to initial familiarity of 
the material (Huber, 2008; Huber, Clark, Curran, & Winkielman, 2008).  
 Huber and colleagues (2008) observed support for these fluency effects through a series 
of experiments in which prime duration was manipulated and tests of recognition were 
employed. Experiment three as outlined in their paper is particularly relevant to the issues 
discussed here. In this experiment, subjects studied lists of (36) random 5-letter word pairs. Each 
study list was followed by a forced-choice recognitio  test which included (24) pairs of target 
and foil words (the targets were words that had been pr sented in the study list and the foils were 
words that had not been presented in the study list) and a prime was flashed before each test pair. 
The subject was instructed to identify which of thewords had been presented at study. There 
were three prime types: neither target nor foil word p imed, target word primed, or foil word 
primed, and two prime durations: 100ms for a short prime or 1000ms for a long prime. 
Following the recognition response, participants were provided with feedback about which of the 
words was the correct (target) word that had been pr sented in the study phase and were then 
asked to identify the word that it was paired with a  study if they were able to do so. This 
methodology was brought on by the prediction that recollection should not be affected by the 
manipulation of perceptual fluency or pre-activation (since recollecting involves generation of 
missing information as opposed to strength of the response) but that recognition judgments of 
past experiments may have been diluted by reliance o  r collection when making 
remember/know or old/new responses. In this way, the experimenters were able to look at 
recognition with and without cued recall to isolate familiarity within the recognition judgment 
(Huber, Clark, Curran, & Winkielman, 2008).  
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 In general, Huber and colleagues (2008) found that recognition was enhanced through 
short duration primes whereas long duration primes seemed to have the opposite effect, with 
primed words lessening likelihood of recognition for the related target. This effect was observed 
even when subjects were explicitly asked about the duration of primes and were able to identify 
the shorter primes and it persisted, manifesting when familiarity-based recognition decisions 
were made apparent by cued-recall failure. The results of their manipulations suggest that 
priming can have a unique effect on familiarity while leaving recollection virtually unaffected 
(Huber, Clark, Curran, & Winkielman, 2008). 
Inhibition/Interference as an Alternative Mechanism Underlying Subjective Novelty 
Experiences 
Despite the promising findings emerging in the semantic satiation and priming literature, 
other mechanisms may underlie novelty experiences. One such possibility can be seen in data 
collected by Neely (1976; 1977b) in an experiment aimed to uncover mechanisms of semantic 
facilitation in lexical decision tasks or faster reaction times when primes are related to the target 
word. In this experiment, reaction times were recorded during a lexical decision task for which 
the subject would have to decide whether the target item presented on screen was a word or a 
nonword. Each of these items were primed prior to presentation in one of three prime conditions: 
the prime was a related word, the prime was an unrelated word, or the prime was a neutral 
nonword (such as, XXX). Three prime durations (or SOAs) were used as well: 360ms, 600ms, 
2000ms.  
 What Neely termed as 'inhibition' referred to anything that might show an inflated 
reaction time for the target word (or nonword) as compared to the reaction time when the neutral 
prime was exhibited (used as the baseline). In contrast, 'facilitation' is used to refer to when a 
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factor is able to decrease reaction time for the task. An 'inhibition effect' was observed for target 
words accompanied by longer prime durations when th prime was an unrelated word; unrelated 
word primes at longer durations led to increased reaction times for the lexical decision task of the 
target word than did related primes or neutral primes at the long duration and reaction time 
decreased as prime duration got shorter (Neely, 1976). Neely proposed, in lines with other 
research at the time, that these results may be reflective of an attentional strategy used by the 
participants in that they are misdirecting their atten ion to the primes and the shift in limited 
attention when the target word is not related to the prime creates a disadvantage for processing of 
the target word. In this way, the prime may be causing an interference when the prime and the 
target are dissimilar by activating associations related to the prime and making it harder or 
slower to activate associations related to the targe  word when it appears (Neely, 1976; 1977b). 
Unlike the implications of the fluency-disfluency model and the satiation effect, this alternative 
inhibition/interference approach would predict depressed abilities in processing of a target 
following prolonged exposure to an unrelated prime. This depressed ability may create a 
reduction in familiarity for a target, and in turn, enhance subjective novelty.
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 A pilot study was carried out in order to test a hybrid of the Huber (2008) fluency-
disfluency paradigm (a variant of the Jacoby-Whitehouse paradigm), using the recognition 
without cued recall paradigm of Cleary and colleagues (Cleary, 2004; Ryals & Cleary, 2012) and 
to further prod the characteristics that may be involved in creating 'unfamiliarity'. The 
recognition without cued recall paradigm was used, as it was by Ryals and Cleary (2012), as it 
allows an isolation of familiarity through investigation of recognition in the absence of recall. 
More specifically, by removing instances in which recall succeeded, the method allows an 
examination of judgments that are based on other processes than recollection, such as familiarity, 
or in the case of the present proposal, novelty. 
 As in Ryals and Cleary (2012), this pilot study utilized study words (ex: distraction, 
tribute, elbow) and nonword test cues, of which, half resembled studied items in terms of 
graphemic features (ex: disfraption for the study word distraction) and half did not (ex: dovil). 
The pilot employed the methods and materials of Experiment 1 (Ryals & Cleary, 2012), with 
additional examination of different durations of exposure to primes. More specifically, prior to 
the test cues we incorporated Huber et al.'s variant of the Jacoby-Whitehouse paradigm. In the 
hybrid paradigm used for the pilot, nonword primes were used in addition to nonword test cues 
and subjects made recognition judgments about whether a similar word appeared on the study 
list.  
Hypotheses 
While this pilot was largely exploratory, to determine if unfamiliarity could be 
manipulated within the RWCR paradigm by manipulating a prime duration, some hypotheses as to 
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expected outcomes were formulated given the prior literature. Overall, an RWCR effect 
was expected whereby test cues resembling study items that failed to be recalled would have 
higher familiarity ratings than test cues not resembling study items. In addition, consistent with 
the lines of Huber et al. (2008), test cues paired with long duration (1000ms), matching primes 
were expected to be met with lower familiarity ratings than those with the short duration (50ms), 
matching primes, those with long duration, mismatched primes, and those with short duration, 
mismatched primes (among test cues that do not lead to successful recall of the corresponding 
study item). Test cues paired with short duration (50ms), matching primes were expected to be 
met with higher familiarity ratings than those paired with all other prime conditions among test 
cues that would not lead to successful recall of the corresponding study item. When the prime 
does not match the test cue, prime duration should have no effect on the familiarity ratings and the 
RWCR effect should persist. 
Method 
Participants   
 Seventy Colorado State University undergraduate students were recruited from the CSU 
Psychology Department subject pool in the fall semester of 2012 and they were given course 
credit as a part of their introductory Psychology course requirements for participation in this 
study. Informed consent was obtained from each participant. 
Materials  
 This program consisted of 6 blocks of study-test pairs. All stimuli were presented visually 
on the screen. The stimuli consisted of 192 potential s udy words and the corresponding 
graphemically similar test cues (e.g., disfraption f r the study word distraction, and foneheed for 
the study word forehead) that had been used in the Ryals and Cleary (2012) experiment that 
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investigated RWCR. Consistent with the paradigm used in that study, each study-test block 
consisted of 16 study words followed by 32 test cues, wherein half (16) of the test cues resembled 
study items and half (16) did not. Block order was r ndomized as was the order of presentation of 
study and test stimuli within each block.    
  All instructions for the task were presented via the E-Prime program and the participants 
were able to self-progress through the study by using the keyboard. Each study word was 
presented in the upper left corner of the computer screen in lower-case letters for 2 s with a 1 s 
inter-stimulus interval. Each study list was immediately followed by the corresponding test list. 
Each item in the test list included a prime that flshed prior to the presentation of the non-word 
test cue. These primes varied in whether they matched t e non-word test cue that immediately 
followed (e.g., for the test cue of foneheed, the prime is foneheed) or whether the prime was a 
mismatching nonword that did not resemble a word from the study list (e.g., for the test cue 
foneheed, the prime is crawfed). The primes also varied in duration. Half of the trials had a 50ms 
prime and the remaining half of the trials had a 1000ms prime (16; 8 with matching primes). Thus, 
there were four types of prime type, prime duration rials: a) matching, 50ms primes (8 items), b) 
matching, 1000ms primes (8 items), c) mismatched, 50ms primes (8 items), d) mismatched, 
1000ms primes (8 items). Prime durations were chosen based on the research by Huber and 
colleagues (2008) suggesting that 50ms prime durations enhanced recognition ratings while 
1000ms prime durations provided enough overexposure to r verse the effect. Fifty millisecond 
primes flashed only once before the test cue. One thousand millisecond primes flashed in 20- 
50ms intervals with 50ms between each flash before the test cue. A pre- and post-prime mask was 
used ($$$$$$$$$$$) and was presented 500ms before and after the presentation of each prime (as  
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per Huber et al., 2008). The test cue appeared immediately after presentation of the mask. Prime 
duration and matching context of the primes were counterbalanced among item assignment.  
Procedure   
 All stimuli were presented via individual Dell computers in individual rooms. They were 
presented on E-Prime 2.0. Once participants had read through and signed the consent forms, and 
were led to the individual experiment booth, the program was started for them and they were able 
to self-progress through the experiment. Participants were instructed that they would be viewing 
words in a study list and that their memory for those words would later be tested in a following 
test list consisting of non-words. They were told that, at test, they would be asked to rate the 
likelihood that a similar word appeared in the study list and to give a rating of likelihood on a 
scale of 0-10, a rating of 0 indicating that they are sure a similar word did not appear in the study 
list and a rating of 10 meaning that they are sure a similar word did appear in the study list. They 
were asked to use the whole scale of ratings. They ar  also asked to try to identify a word that they 
studied that resembled the non-word and to type this word in when prompted if they are able to do 
so. The six study-test sessions would then begin. 
 For each study block, study items were presented on  at a time for 2s with a 1s inter-
stimulus interval. Each test list was preceded by the directions, “You will now begin the test 
phase. You will be viewing a list of non-words preceded by words or non-words that will be 
flashed briefly. You will need to judge the likelihood that the final word is similar to a word that 
appeared on the previous study list. You will also be asked to identify the word on the study list 
that this non-word resembles if you are able to do so. Press 1 to begin.” Each mask, prime, and 
test cue appeared in lower-case letters in the upper left corner of the screen. Congruous with the 
Ryals and Cleary (2012) study paradigm, for each cue presented on the test, participants were first 
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asked to provide a familiarity rating for that cue using a 0 (very unfamiliar) to 10 (very familiar) 
scale to indicate the likelihood that the cue resembl d a word from the previously studied list 
(“Please rate the likelihood that a similar word appeared in the study list on a 0-10 scale; 
0=Completely Unsure, 10=Completely Sure). They were then asked if they could recall a word 
from the study list that resembled the test item and were prompted to type it into a dialogue box if 
they were able to do so (‘‘Do you recall a word from the study list that resembles this item? If so, 
type it in.’’). These measures allowed simultaneous examination of familiarity (ratings) and 
recollection (target identification proportions and familiarity ratings given in the presence of 
recall) across study status (test item associated with studied word vs unstudied), prime status 
(prime matching test cue vs mismatch), and prime duration (50ms prime vs 1000ms prime).   
 Results 
Data Analyses  
 Data were hand coded for correct identification of target word. This was to ensure that 
spelling mistakes did not result in erroneously marking an identified item as unidentified.  
Successful Recall Proportions  
 A repeated measures 2 (Study Status: target studied vs target not studied) x 2 (Prime 
Duration: 50ms prime vs 1000ms prime) x 2 (Prime Match Status: matching prime vs mismatched 
prime) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to analyze the proportion of targets recalled 
in response to the cues (correctly identified targets/total number of items) among the conditions 
(See Figure 3 for distribution). Other than a main effect of Study Status, no effects were predicted 
since the work of Huber and colleagues (2008) indicated that the prime duration manipulations 
should have virtually no effect on recollection performance. However, some research has 
suggested that part of what is observed in the Jacoby-Whitehouse effect may be due to a 
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contribution of recollection. This is primarily spearheaded by studies that have shown that the 
standard remember-know procedure itself may be responsible for the lack of observed effects of 
priming on recollection and that recollection too may have an inferential component (See Kurilla 
& Westerman, 2008). Kurilla and Westerman (2008) were able to replicate the Jacoby-
Whitehouse effect when they used this procedure, showing an isolated effect of prime duration 
(subliminal vs supraliminal primes) on familiarity (and no effect on recollection). However, when 
they instead applied an independent ratings response method (e.g., the subject was asked to 
provide a 1-4 rating of familiarity and a separate 1-4 rating of recollection for each test item), 
increasing both perceptual and conceptual fluency through the use of a brief prime led to both 
heightened familiarity ratings and recollection ratings.    
 In the present analysis, both the main effect of Study Status [higher proportions of correct 
target identifications were observed when test cues resembled studied items (M=.676) than when 
test cues did not resemble items from the study list (M=.21), F(1,69)=523.96, p<.001, η2=.884] 
and the main effect of Prime Duration were significant [test cues following 50ms primes gave rise 
to significantly higher proportions of identifications than did test cues following 1000ms primes, 
F(1,69)=5.83, p=.018, η2=.078]. The latter of these results suggests that, at least in this particular 
case, manipulating the duration of the prime did have n effect on recollection (See Table 1 and 
Figure 2). Since this occurred regardless of whether the prime matched the test cue, it could be an 
attentional effect. A significant study Status x Prime Match Status interaction occurred, 
F(1,69)=4.603, p=.035, η2=.063.  All other main effects and interactions didnot reach a level of 
significance [Prime Match Status: F(1,69)=2.98, p=.089, η2=.041; Prime Duration x Prime Match 
Status: F(1,69)=.897, p=.347, η2=.013; Study Status x Prime Duration: F(1,69)=.237, p=.628, 
η
2=.003; Study Status x Prime Duration x Prime Match Status: F(1,69)=.008, p=.929, η2<.001 
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(See Figure 2)]. Again, these results may be partially explained by the idea that recollection 
contributes to the Jacoby-Whitehouse effect. 
Cue Familiarity Ratings During Recall Success   
 Familiarity ratings were analyzed among test cues that did lead to successful retrieval of a 
similar study item via a repeated measures 2 (Study Status: studied target vs. unstudied target) x 2 
(Prime Duration: 50ms vs 1000ms) x 2 (Prime Match Status: matching prime vs mismatched 
prime) analysis of variance (ANOVA). This analysis revealed a significant effect of Study Status, 
whereby test cues that resembled study items receivd higher familiarity ratings (M=8.67) than did 
test cues that did not resemble studied items (M=5.16), F(1,69)=225.18, p<.001, η2=.765. No 
other main effects reached significance [Prime Duration: F(1,69)=.425, p=.52, η2=.006; Prime 
Match Status: F(1,69)=.20, p=.65, η2=.003]. A significant interaction was observed between 
Prime Duration and Prime Match Status, F(1,69)=5.00, p=.03, η2=.068. When test cues and 
primes matched, familiarity ratings were higher for 50ms prime durations (M=7.09) than for 
1000ms prime durations (M=6.80). However, a much smaller difference showing the opposite 
trend was found among prime durations when the primes did not match the test cues (50ms: 
M=6.81; 1000ms: M=6.97) (See Table 2, Figure 4).  
Cue Familiarity Ratings During Recall Failure and the Recognition without Cued Recall 
(RWCR) Effect 
 An initial general analysis was performed to assess the data for the recognition without 
cued-recall (RWCR) effect that had been found in previous research, without considering the 
effects of prime match and prime duration. This effect was in fact apparent in the overall data with 
test cues that were graphemically and orthographically similar to items that had been on the study 
list eliciting significantly higher familiarity ratings (M=3.44, SD=1.57) than test cues that did not 
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resemble studied items (unstudied) (M=2.02, SD=1.19) among test cues for which no similar 
study items could be identified, t(69)=10.02, p<.001 (See Figure 2).  
 To examine the RWCR effect in more detail, familiarity ratings for test items that 
resembled study items but were unable to be identifi d were compared across Match Status and 
Prime Duration. A 2 (Study Status: target studied vs target not studied) x 2 (Prime Match Status: 
match vs. mismatch) x 2 (Prime Duration: 50ms vs. 1000ms) repeated measures ANOVA was 
performed examining familiarity ratings for test cues that did not lead to successful retrieval of a 
similar study item across the independent variables. Overall, a significant three-way interaction 
was observed between these variables (Study Status x Prime Match Status x Prime Duration), 
F(1,69)=8.74, p=.004, η2=.112. This pattern can be observed in Figure 5 and is prescriptive of 
long-duration mismatched primes lessening or weakening the effect of familiarity that is seen in 
all other conditions in which test cues resemble unrecalled studied items (See Table 3, Figure 5). 
Further analyses were carried out to isolate and try to understand the individual components that 
contributed to this interaction. 
 A significant main effect of Study Status emerged in these data; test cues that resembled 
study items elicited higher familiarity ratings (M=3.00, SD=1.57) than test cues that had no 
studied word counterparts (M=1.99, SD=1.19), F(1,69)=104.06, p<.001, η2=.601. A main effect of 
Prime Match Status was observed such that familiarity ratings were higher overall for items that 
matched (M=2.73) than for those that did not match (M=2.26), F(1,69)=30.08, p<.001, η2=.304.  
Significantly higher familiarity ratings were also een for the short duration primes (M=2.63) 
versus the long duration primes (M=2.36), F(1,69)=11.11, p=.001, η2=.139.  
A significant interaction was observed between the Study Status and Prime Match Status 
variables; test cues that resembled studied items and followed a matching prime (M=3.44, 
 35
SD=1.69) had higher familiarity ratings assigned to them than test cues that resembled studied 
items but followed mismatched primes (M=2.56, SD=1.65), whereas the relationship was not so 
distinguishable between prime match conditions among test cues that did not resemble items from 
study [matching prime: M=2.03; mismatched prime: M=1.96], F(1,69)=26.48, p<.001, η2=.277. 
The Study Status by Prime Duration interaction alsosh wed a significant relationship, 
F(1,69)=11.06, p=.001, η2=.138. Among test cues that resembled studied items, tho e with a 50ms 
prime received higher familiarity ratings (M=3.29, SD=1.61) than those with 1000ms primes 
(M=2.71, SD=1.77). Of test cues that did not resemble studied items, those with 50ms (M=1.98) 
were met with only slightly lower familiarity ratings than those with 1000ms primes (M=2.01). To 
sum up, the RWCR effect was diminished in mismatched prime conditions as well as in 1000ms 
prime conditions. An interaction between Prime Match Status and Prime Duration came forth in 
the data as well; whereas the familiarity ratings did not change in the matching prime condition 
depending on duration (50ms prime: M=2.71; 1000ms prime: M=2.76), when the primes did not 
match the test cues, familiarity ratings were higher for test items that had a 50ms duration prime 
(M=2.56) as opposed to the 1000ms duration prime (M=1.96), F(1,69)=26.40, p<.001, η2=.277 
(See Table 3, Figure 6). Taken together, this again accentuates the pattern that the RWCR effect 
of higher familiarity ratings for test cues that resemble studied items is attenuated or impeded in 
the mismatched long duration (1000ms) prime condition. 
Summary and Statement of the Problem   
 Considering the literature outlined above, novelty seems to be important for learning and 
memory. We see evidence for this through the way tht we neurologically deal with novel 
information from our environments and then react behaviorally. Dual process models provide us 
with an account of recognition memory that is not unidimensional and possibilities of other 
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processes involved in recognition have stemmed fromresearch in this field. Occurrences of 
experience of familiarity coinciding with experience of novelty (such as in the experience of déjà 
vu) insinuate that different processes may be involved in these two types of experience. In 
addition, experiments that have investigated effects of priming and have tested models of semantic 
satiation, habituation, and fluency have provided some insight in to how we might observe and 
manipulate the subjective experience of novelty. Experiment 1 was designed to induce 
‘unfamiliarity’ by creating overexposure to a test cue resembling a studied item. By first 
investigating whether these manipulations of fluency could alter the degree of the sense of 
familiarity (using the established rating scale for the RWCR paradigm), we could then attempt to 
approach novelty more directly to then investigate whether it is synonymous with unfamiliarity. 
Thus, this first study provided a start into the research, suggesting that the inhibition/interference 
mechanism explained by Neely (1976; 1977b) could potentially be an explanation for the results. 
However, measures of feelings of familiarity were th only measures used in Experiment 1 and in 
the previous literature investigating these effects. If it is possible that novelty, or a feelings of 
newness, is aseparate subjective experience, perhaps the questions that are asked need to be 
framed differently to truly tap the target experienc , such as by asking for feelings of novelty, 
rather than feelings of familiarity. Asking people for feelings of novelty, rather than familiarity, is 
important because an assumption inherent in many models (e.g., Rinkus, 2010) is that novelty is 
simply the inverse of familiarity (and not a separate or independent subjective experience).  
 Additionally, findings from Experiment 1 did not support the hypotheses and did not quite 
fit with the existing theories and models. There ar several possible reasons for this. First, this 
study uses cues at the orthographic level of resemblance (or feature overlap from study to test), 
which, although included in Huber's (2008) model, has not previously been investigated to explore 
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issues of habituation from cue repetition priming. Second, it is possible that the prime durations 
used in Experiment 1 were not long enough to elicit the habituation effect. In fact, the 50ms 
primes did not show the facilitation to familiarity ratings that would be expected based on the 
Jacoby-Whitehouse literature either, suggesting that either the prime durations selected may not 
have been optimal to exhibit the fluency-disfluency effects on recognition judgments, or these 
effects do not occur in situations of resemblance, where there is feature-overlap but the test items 
are not identical matches to studied items. In the latt r case, it could mean that orthographic 
feature-overlap from study to test does not contribu e as much to the fluency-disfluency process as 
lexical or semantic features. In any case, reconciling these findings and revealing the interplay 
between feelings of familiarity, feelings of novelty, and actual objective measures of recognition 
may provide additional insight into mechanisms of memory. 
 The pilot experiment (Experiment 1) gave some insight nto whether mechanisms of 
saturation might reduce feelings of familiarity during retrieval failure; however, the experiment 
did not directly examine feelings of novelty. The next two experiments were aimed at addressing 
this, as well as to more closely inspect through replication the previous manipulations of prime 
match and duration. One major question investigated in Experiments 2 and 3 was whether novelty 
ratings exhibit the pattern that would be predicted if the sense of novelty is simply the inverse of 
familiarity. If novelty is the inverse of familiarity, then ratings of cue novelty during retrieval 
failure should show the inverse pattern of that shown with cue familiarity ratings. Also, although 
the opposite ratings pattern should emerge (with hig er cue familiarity ratings for cues resembling 
than not resembling studied targets and lower cue novelty ratings for cues resembling than not 
resembling studied targets), the magnitude of the effect of cue resemblance to studied items 
should not depend on whether cue familiarity or cue novelty ratings are given. If the type of rating 
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matters to the magnitude of the cue resemblance effect, this would suggest that there is more to 
the sense of novelty than it being the simple inverse of familiarity.  
 Another question examined in Experiment 2 was whether manipulation of prime duration 
and match to a test cue that potentially shares orthog aphic features with a study item reliably 
alters subjective experience for that study item. The main question was whether the prime match 
and duration pattern shown in Experiment 1 will replicate in Experiment 2, and if so, will this 
pattern extend to novelty ratings as well? If the pattern extends to novelty ratings, another 
question concerns whether the novelty ratings pattern will be the inverse of that shown with 
familiarity ratings. Based on the findings of Experiment 1, if novelty ratings manifest as the 
inverse of familiarity ratings, then we would expect long duration mismatched primes to be met 
with higher novelty ratings of the test cue than when no primes are present, whereas lower 
novelty ratings would be expected in response to test cues preceded by short primes as opposed 
to a condition with no primes. However, it is possible that the use of the novelty rating scale 
itself could result in a satiation effect, and if this is the case, it will be the matching long duration 







 The primary purpose of Experiment 2 was to replicate Experiment 1 with the addition of a 
new rating scale, novelty ratings (or feeling of new ss ratings) in order to determine if judging 
the familiarity versus the novelty of the test cue makes a difference to the pattern of results. 
Toward this end, some participants were asked to provide ratings of feeling of newness (novelty 
ratings) rather than ratings of feeling of familiarty. A between-subject rating type condition was 
utilized, whereby half of the participants were asked to respond with familiarity ratings, as was the 
case in Experiment 1, and half were asked to respond with novelty ratings to test whether the type 




 One hundred seventy Colorado State University undergraduate students were recruited 
from the CSU Psychology Department subject pool and given course credit as a part of their 
introductory Psychology course requirements for participation in this study. Six subjects were 
dropped due to not completing the experiment (in most cases this was due to the computer 
crashing mid experiment, in one case the participant started the experiment late and was not able 
to complete the experiment in the alloted time) . Each subject identified as fluent in English. 
Informed consent was obtained from each participant. Subjects were divided into the rating type 
between-subject groupings by random assignment. This resulted in 164 participants, 78 in the 
familiarity rating scale group and 86 in the novelty rating scale group. The uneven number of 
participants in the two rating conditions was the result of: 1) a disproportionate number of 
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dropped subjects coming from the familiarity condition, and 2) Two subjects mistakenly being 
run through a version of the Novelty rating experiment rather than the intended Familiarity rating 
experiment. Each subject was run through the study in an individual room.  
Materials  
 All stimuli were presented visually on a computer. The stimuli used for the behavioral task 
were drawn from the same pool of 192 potential study words and the corresponding graphemically 
similar test cues (e.g., disfraption for the study word distraction, and foneheed for the study word 
forehead) that was used in Ryals and Cleary (2012) and Experiment 1. The stimuli were 
assembled in an E-Prime program that was presented to participants. Study and test stimuli were 
separated into six study-test blocks for each participant, each containing 16 study words followed 
by 32 test cues. Half (16) of the test cues resembld study items and half (16) did not. Order of 
presentation of study and test stimuli was randomized within each block and block presentation 
was also randomized. 
  Each study word was presented in the upper left corner of the computer screen for 2 s with 
a 1 s inter-stimulus interval. Each study list was immediately followed by its corresponding test 
list. Each non-word test cue was presented in lower case letters in the upper left corner of the 
screen. Test cues were each preceded by a prime that flashed in varying durations; a 50ms prime 
was presented in half of the primed trials (16) and 1000ms prime occurred in the other half of 
trials (16). Fifty millisecond primes flashed only once before the test cue. 1000 millisecond primes 
flashed in 20 50ms intervals with 50ms between each fl s  before the test cue. A 500ms mask 
($$$$$$$$$$$) was used before and after the prime to d ter “visual persistence,” and presentation 
of the test cue immediately followed the post-prime ask. Additionally, half of these primes  
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matched the non-word test cue that followed it (16) and half did not (16). Prime duration and 
match conditions were counterbalanced among item assignment. 
Procedure   
 Participants were greeted and given a consent form t  compete before beginning the 
experiment. Upon completion, each was escorted to an individual booth in which the E-Prime 
program was set up on the computer for the participant to begin. Instructions were given on the 
screen and participants progressed through the program by pressing 'enter'. Instructions were 
given within the program. Then the participants progressed through six blocks of study-test pairs. 
During study, participants were instructed to pay attention to the words presented in the upper left 
corner of the screen and that a test would follow the study phase. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two ratings conditions: The famili rity rating condition and the novelty rating 
condition. These two conditions are described below. 
 Familiarity Rating Condition. Congruous with the procedures of the pilot, for each cue 
presented on the test, participants were first asked to provide a familiarity rating for that cue using 
a 0 (very unfamiliar) to 10 (very familiar) scale to indicate the likelihood that the cue resembled a 
word from the previously studied list. They were thn asked if they could recall a word from the 
study list that resembled the test cue and were prom ted to type their response into a dialogue box 
if able to do so. The box prompted them with: “Do you recall a word from the study list that 
resembles this item? If so, type it in.”  
 Novelty Rating Condition. For each cue presented on the test, participants were first 
asked to provide a novelty rating of the test cue its lf. They were told that all of the test cues are 
non-words, so all are new, but that we would like th m to indicate how foreign that cue seems at 
presentation. They were asked to rate the 'feeling of newness' using the scale of 0 (does not feel 
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new) to 10 (feels very new). Following the rating, participants were asked, “Do you recall a word 
from the study list that resembles this item? If so, type it in.” Participants were prompted to type 
the studied word into a dialog box.  
Results 
Data Analyses   
 Data were sorted and coded for identification statu of the test stimuli. This was done by 
hand to ensure that any misspellings were correctly categorized. One dependent measure was the 
proportion of targets correctly identified from the orthographic cues for studied and non-studied 
items across conditions. The other was the ratings measure (either mean familiarity ratings or 
mean novelty ratings) across conditions. The ratings were examined across the conditions of 
Rating Type (familiarity vs. novelty ratings), Study Status (target studied vs. unstudied), Prime 
Duration (50 ms vs. 1000 ms), Prime Match (match vs. mi match to the test cue), and Retrieval 
Status (target identification success vs. failure).  
The Recognition without Cued Recall (RWCR) Effect 
 As one of the key interests in the study was the pattern of ratings in instances of recall 
failure, an initial analysis was conducted to asses the data for the recognition without cued-recall 
(RWCR) effect across both rating conditions (familiar ty ratings and novelty ratings). The RWCR 
effect is the finding of higher cue familiarity ratings for cues resembling studied items than for 
cues not resembling studied items during retrieval failure. The RWCR effect is thought to reflect 
cue familiarity-detection brought on by cue resemblance to (or feature overlap with) a studied 
item during the studied item’s retrieval failure. This effect had been demonstrated in previous 
research and in the pilot study through the observation that test cues resembling unidentified study 
items were rated as significantly more familiar than test cues that do not resemble study items. A 2 
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(Rating Type: familiarity ratings vs novelty ratings) x 2 (Study Status: target studied vs target 
unstudied) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed with Rating Type as 
the between-subject factor, Study Status as the within-subject variable and ratings as the 
dependent variable. This analysis revealed a main effect of Rating Type; familiarity ratings 
(M=2.88, SD=1.40) were lower in general than novelty ratings (M=6.80, SD=1.57), 
F(1,162)=305.61, p<.001, η2=.65.  
 The main effect of Study Status was also found to be significant. Overall, ratings were 
higher across both rating types for test cues that resembled study items (M=5.02, SE=.12) than for 
test cues that did not (M=4.67, SE=.11), F(1,162)=25.70, p<.001, η2=.25. However, this was 
carried largely by the familiarity rating condition, as the main effect of Study Status was qualified 
by a significant Rating Type x Study Status interaction, F(1,162)=165.30, p<.001, η2=.51. Within 
the familiarity rating condition, test cues that were orthographically similar to study items gave 
rise to significantly higher familiarity ratings (M=3.45, SD=1.54) than did test cues that did not 
resemble studied items (unstudied) (M=2.25, SD=1.33) among test items for which no similar 
study items could be identified. Within the novelty rating condition, orthographically similar test 
cues brought forth lower novelty ratings (M=6.46, SD=1.73) than did dissimilar test cues 
(unstudied) (M=6.98, SD=1.72) among test cues for which no similar study items could be 
identified (See Figure 7). 
 To assess whether the magnitude of the difference between ratings for cues of studied and 
of unstudied target words differed across rating conditions, difference values were calculated in 
each rating condition between ratings assigned to studied cues and those assigned to unstudied 
cues. The absolute value was taken of each of thesedifference values to account for the 
interaction effect described above (e.g., in the famili rity rating condition, studied cues correspond 
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with high ratings and unstudied cues with low ratings, and vice versa in the novelty rating 
condition) (See Figure 8 for a distribution of these values). A one-way ANOVA was performed to 
investigate the difference between the familiarity rating absolute difference values and the novelty 
rating absolute difference values, revealing that te difference in ratings for cues of studied items 
and cues of unstudied items in the familiarity rating condition (M=1.28, SD=.95) was significantly 
larger than the difference in ratings for cues of studied items and cues of unstudied items in the 
novelty rating condition (M=.68, SD=.58), F(1, 162)=24.15, p<.001, η2=.13. Thus, the study-
status of the unidentified target had a larger effect on judgments of familiarity than on judgments 
of novelty. This suggests that novelty judgments are not simply the inverse of familiarity 
judgments.  
The Effects of Prime Match and Duration 
The next sections separately examine how the familirity and novelty ratings were affected 
by the conditions of Prime Match and Prime Duration. Familiarity and novelty ratings will be 
examined separately, starting with familiarity ratings given during recall success then turning to 
familiarity ratings given during recall failure, foll wed by novelty ratings given during recall 
success then turning to novelty ratings given during ecall failure.  
 Cue Familiarity Ratings During Recall Success. Familiarity ratings were analyzed 
among test cues that did lead to successful retrieval of a similar study item via a repeated 
measures 2 (Study Status: studied target vs. unstudied target) x 2 (Prime Duration: 50ms vs 
1000ms) x 2 (Prime Match Status: matching prime vs mismatched prime) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). This analysis revealed a significant effect of Study Status, whereby test cues that 
resembled study items received higher familiarity ratings (M= 8.83, SD= 0.88) than did test cues 
that did not resemble studied items (M=5.21, SD=2.62), F(1,78)=245.20, p<.001, η2=.759. No 
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other main effects reached significance [Prime Duration: F(1,78)=2.59, p=.11, η2=.032; Prime 
Match Status: F(1,78)=.008, p=.93, η2=<.001] nor did any interactions among variables [Study 
Status x Prime Match Status: F(1,78)=.003, p=.96, η2<.001; Prime Duration x Prime Match 
Status: F(1,78)=.112, p=.74, η2=.001; Study Status x Prime Duration: F(1,78)=.18, p=.67, 
η
2=.002; Study Status x Prime Duration x Prime Match Status: F(1,78)=.122, p=.73, η2=.002] (See 
Table 4, Figure 9).  
Cue Familiarity Ratings During Recall Failure. To examine whether and how the Prime 
Duration and Prime Match conditions affected the RWCR effect, cue familiarity ratings for test 
cues that resembled unidentified study items were compared across Prime Match and Prime 
Duration. A 2 (Study Status: target studied vs target unstudied) x 2 (Prime Match Status: match 
vs. mismatch) x 2 (Prime Duration: 50ms vs. 1000ms) repeated measures ANOVA was performed 
on cue familiarity ratings for test cues that did not lead to successful retrieval of a similar study 
item. The data exhibited a significant main effect of Study Status, such that est cues that 
resembled unidentified study items elicited higher familiarity ratings (M=3.45, SD=1.54) than test 
cues that had no studied word counterparts (M=2.25, SD=1.33), F(1,77)=111.44, p<.001, η2=.591. 
 No other main effects reached significance [Prime Duration: F(1,77)=.18, p=.68, η2=.002; 
Prime Match Status: F(1,77)=1.21, p=.28, η2=.015] nor did any interactions among variables 
[Study Status x Prime Match Status: F(1,77)=1.68, p=.20, η2=.021; Prime Duration x Prime Match 
Status: F(1,77)=1.07, p=.30, η2=.014; Study Status x Prime Duration: F(1,77)=.162, p=.69, 
η
2=.002; Study Status x Prime Duration x Prime Match Status: F(1,77)=.831, p=.365, η2=.011] 
(See Table 5, Figure 10). 
Cue Novelty Ratings During Recall Success. Cue novelty ratings given in the presence 
of cued recall and novelty ratings given to test cues that did not lead to successful cued recall were 
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analyzed separately to examine how the novelty ratings diffuse into the RWCR effect (or if they 
do). Novelty ratings were analyzed among test cues that led to successful retrieval of a similar 
study item via a repeated measures 2 (Study Status: studied target vs. unstudied target) x 2 (Prime 
Duration: 50ms vs 1000ms) x 2 (Prime Match Status: matching prime vs mismatched prime) 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). This analysis revealed a significant effect of Study Status, 
whereby test cues that resembled study items receivd lower cue novelty ratings (M=2.23, 
SD=1.60) than test cues that did not resemble studied items (M=3.61, SD=2.20), F(1,85)=47.06, 
p<.001, η2=.356. The difference between Prime Match conditions approached significance, 
F(1,85)=3.30, p=.07, η2=.037, with matching primes resulting in lower novelty ratings (M=2.85, 
SD=1.83) than mismatched prime conditions (M=3.00, SD=1.98) regardless of Study Status or 
Prime Duration condition. No significant difference was observed between short and long 
durations (main effect of Prime Duration), F(1,85)=.039, p=.84, η2<.001. None of the interactions 
reached significance [Study Status x Prime Match Status: F(1,85)=.451, p=.50, η2=.005; Study 
Status x Prime Duration: F(1,85)=.242, p=.62, η2=.003; Prime Match Status x Prime Duration: 
F(1,85)=.56, p=.46, η2=.007; Study Status x Prime Match Status x Prime Duration: F(1,85)=1.86, 
p=.18, η2=.021] (See Table 6, Figure 11).  
Cue Novelty Ratings During Recall Failure. Cue novelty ratings for cues that resembled 
unrecalled study items and unidentified unstudied it ms were compared across Prime Match status 
and Prime Duration. A 2 (Study Status: studied target vs. unstudied target) x 2 (Prime Duration: 
50ms vs 1000ms) x 2 (Prime Match Status: matching prime vs mismatched prime) repeated 
measures ANOVA was performed on cue novelty ratings given during target retrieval failure.  
 A significant main effect of Study Status was shown; test cues that resembled study items 
elicited lower novelty ratings (M=6.53, SD=1.85) than test cues that had no studied word 
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counterparts (M=7.05, SD=1.65), F(1,85)=42.07, p<.001, η2=.331. No other main effects reached 
significance [Prime Duration: F(1,85)=2.24, p=.14, η2=.026; Prime Match Status: F(1,85)=.59, 
p=.45, η2=.007]. None of the interactions between variables reached significance [Study Status x 
Prime Match Status: F(1,85)=.439, p=.51, η2=.005; Study Status x Prime Duration: F(1,85)=1.07, 
p=.30, η2=.012; Prime Match Status x Prime Duration: F(1,85)=.032, p=.86, η2<.001; Study Status 
x Prime Match Status x Prime Duration: F(1,85)=.161, p=.69, η2=.002] (See Table 7, Figure 12). 
Successful Recall Proportions 
 Identification proportions within each independent variable condition were calculated. A 2 
(Rating Type: Familiarity ratings vs. Novelty ratings) x 2 (Study Status: target studied vs. target 
unstudied) x 2 (Prime Duration: 50ms prime vs. 1000ms prime) x 2 (Prime Match Staus: Match 
vs. Mismatch) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to analyze the proportion of study 
items the participants were able to identify across each of these conditions.  
 A main effect of Study Status was observed by which igher proportions of correct target 
identifications were observed when test cues resembled studied items (M=.67, SD=.15) than when 
test cues did not resemble items from the study list (M=.24, SD=.16), F(1,164)=1340.33, p<.001, 
η
2=.891. A significant interaction between Study Status and Rating Type was also observed, 
F(1,164)=10.14, p=.002, η2=.058; mean recall proportions for unstudied items in the novelty 
rating condition (M=.27, SD=.17) is higher than those in the familiarity rating condition (M=.20, 
SD=.14). 
 Contrary to the results observed in Experiment 1, however, the present analysis did not 
reveal a main effect of Prime Duration, F(1,164)=1.17, p=.28, η2=.007, nor a significant Study 
Status x Prime Match Status interaction, F(1,164)=.96, p=.33, η2=.006. All other main effects and 
interactions also did not reach a level of significan e [Rating Type: F(1,164)=2.14, p=.15, 
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η
2=.013; Prime Match Status: F(1,164)=1.56, p=.21, η2=.009; Rating Type x Prime Match Status: 
F(1,164)=.368, p=.55, η2=.002; Rating Type x Prime Duration: F(1,164)=.737, p=.39, η2=.004; 
Prime Duration x Prime Match Status: F(1,164)=1.77, p=.19, η2=.011; Study Status x Prime 
Duration: F(1,164)=1.03, p=.31, η2=.006; Study Status x Rating Type x Prime Match Status: 
F(1,164)=.355, p=.552, η2=.002; Study Status x Prime Duration x Rating Type: F(1,164)=1.33, 
p=.25, η2=1.33; Rating Type x Prime Duration x Prime Match Status: F(1,164)=.396, p=.53, 
η
2=.002; Study Status x Prime Duration x Prime Match Status: F(1,164)=.011, p=.918, η2<.001; 
Rating Type x Study Status x Prime Duration x Prime Match Status: F(1,164)=.611, p=.434, 
η
2=.002 (See Tables 8 & 9, Figures 13 & 14)].  
Discussion 
The Recognition without Cued Recall (RWCR) Effect 
 The standard recognition without cued recall (RWCR) effect was observed by which test 
cues that resembled study items were given higher familiarity ratings than test cues that did not 
resemble study items. As expected, an inverse of this effect was observed in the novelty rating 
condition; test cues that resembled study items were given lower novelty ratings than test cues that 
did not resemble study items. However, the degree of this effect differed between the two rating 
types. The RWCR effect was significantly smaller in the novelty rating condition, meaning that 
the difference in the novelty ratings assigned to test cues that resembled study items and test cues 
that did not resemble study items was not as large s it is when a subject is asked to give 
familiarity ratings. 
 Two factors might be considered in deciding whether novelty ratings are the inverse of 
familiarity ratings, basically representing unfamiliarity: 1) One may be that the relationship 
between ratings given to studied items and unstudied items is reversed. This is very much the 
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case. The pattern of higher ratings assigned to studied items and lower ratings given to unstudied 
items in the familiarity rating condition is reversd in the novelty rating condition where lower 
ratings are ascribed to studied items and higher ratings to unstudied items. 2) The other is that the 
magnitude of that relationship is consistent across ating conditions or the degree of difference is 
mirrored in the conditions. Our analysis of the absolute differences of ratings between study status 
in both rating conditions reveals that this pattern does not occur in the data.  
 Taken together, the results regarding these two fact rs could suggest that familiarity 
ratings and novelty ratings have some common basis, perhaps some sense of prior experience. 
However, in considering subjective experiences of familiarity and novelty, the difference in the 
relationship between previously experienced and new items among the rating scales suggests that 
one is not simply the inverse of the other. It may be that the factors that contribute to these 
experiences and lead to these judgments vary between familiarity and novelty. 
The Effects of Prime Match and Prime Duration on Cue Familiarity and Novelty Ratings 
 Familiarity Ratings. The duration of the prime presented before the cue did not seem to 
have an effect on the ratings given; nor did whether t  prime matched the test cue or was a new 
nonword. These results were inconsistent with the results of Experiment 1 which suggested a 
unique effect in that the mismatched long (1000ms) primes produced lower familiarity ratings 
than the matching primes (both short and long) and mismatched short primes for test cues that 
resembled studied words while leaving ratings of new test cues relatively unaffected. The current 
data did not support the semantic satiation hypothesis, the interference or inhibition hypothesis, 
nor did it support Huber's fluency-disfluency model. In fact, no significant differences existed 
among these conditions, which suggests that familiarity ratings for test cues can not be 
manipulated through duration of exposure to those cues and that prolonged exposure to a test cue  
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does not disrupt the recognition rating benefit thacue gets when it resembles a word from a 
previously studied list. 
 The fact that the classic Jacoby-Whitehouse effect was not observed in this data nor the 
pilot data (Experiment 1) is puzzling. To observe this effect, we would have seen the test cues for 
which there was a matching 50ms prime exhibiting a higher familiarity rating than that of all other 
conditions. These findings can be added to those of literature that have found instances in which 
the Jacoby-Whitehouse effect is reduced or eliminated. For instance Gallo, Perlmutter, Moore, and 
Schacter (2008) found that conditions present at study can reduce the effect. In their experiment, 
subjects were presented with the word followed by either a picture of the word or an auditory 
presentation of the word at study and, at test, matching primes produced higher hit and false alarm 
rates in the auditory condition, displaying the effect, but matching primes produced similar 
recognition rates as the mismatched primes in the picture condition and false alarm rates were 
reduced in this condition overall. The authors attribute this to a postretrieval monitoring view of 
the distinctiveness heuristic – recognition judgments follow attempts to retrieve the picture 
recollections. When subjects fail to recollect a picture, they judge the cue as new, but when they 
are able to recollect a picture, that cue is given an 'old' judgment (Gallo, Perlmutter, Moore, & 
Schacter, 2008).  
 The present experiment varied from previous studies that used a paradigm similar to the 
Jacoby-Whitehouse paradigm in that orthographic featur s were the only attribute maintained 
from study to test; test cues did not replicate study words. This may be an explanation for why we 
did not observe these classic effects in the current data. Similarly, it may be considered a factor 
that weakens the effects and future experiments may be useful in investigating this orthographic 
level further. 
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Novelty Ratings. Novelty ratings were generally lower for test cues that resembled study 
items and higher for test cues that did not resembl any words previously studied. This pattern 
persisted when identification of study items was not successful as well. Novelty ratings were also 
lower for test cues for which corresponding study words were identified than for those for which 
the similar study words were not identified. These results are not surprising and support the 
reverse relationship to familiarity ratings that was discussed earlier.  
 Of some interest is that in the instances in which successful recall of similar study words 
occurred, the prime match condition had some influece (although not statistically significant) on 
the rating given to the test cue. A slightly lower rating was given when the primes matched than 
when the primes did not match the test cue. This may be a variant manifestation of the Jacoby-
Whitehouse effect. Perhaps the matching prime gave the participant a head start to retrieve that 
target word from study, thus resulting in that lower rating. It is possible that this was not the case 
in the conditions when the subject was not able to identify the study word that looked similar to 
the nonword presented at test because the cue did not successfully activate any memory 
representations corresponding to studied words.  
Successful Recall Proportions 
 In examining proportions of successful recall, again we find an effect of whether a test cue 
resembled a study word or not. A higher proportion of study words were recalled when the test 
cue was orthographically similar to a studied word. While the identification proportions of study 
words remain relatively similar among those that had a presented similar test cue across rating 
conditions, correct guesses (by which subjects were abl  to identify correct study words after 
presented with the test cue even though they did not study that word) were slightly more frequent 
(~.07) in the novelty rating condition. It may be that something about the framing of the rating 
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request allows for a different experience of the cuand an openness to assess the cue by similar 
features to all words (not just those presented in the study phase of the experiment). 
 These results did not mimic those of Experiment 1. The experiment 1 data suggested an 
effect of prime duration that manifested in proportion of study words recalled. However, no effect 
of prime duration or prime match status was observed in the data of the present study.  
Limitations 
 One limitation for this study was that the number of items that led to mean ratings is 
highly dependent upon the number in each established category that are identified (See Table 10), 
which often leads to a low number of items in certain conditions providing the basis for the mean 
ratings. Additionally, it is unclear what led to the differences in results between Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2. Very few changes were made in procedures between the two. This discrepancy in 
the data should be explored further in additional experiments as should the failure again in 







 Experiment 3 addressed the general research questions outlined in the introduction while 
incorporating a new component, verbal pronunciation and repetition. Research addressing early 
language acquisition suggests that phonological accompaniment to orthographic cues facilitates 
learning the orthographic features of new words (Share, 2004). Orthographic representations are 
said to be initially acquired or learned by 'sounding out' the unfamiliar formation of letters (or 
phonologically decoding) (Share, 2004). Consequently, it may be that if exposure to shared 
orthographic features between study words and test cues are not salient enough to lead to any 
facilitation or hampering of recognition processing as is observed in the Jacoby-Whitehouse effect 
and the disfluency effect in habituation, addition of a phonological component, highly linked to 
orthographic and semantic information, may capacitate these effects. 
 Evidence for this can be seen in the findings in Neely's (1977a) work that had subjects in 
two conditions: one group exposed to visual satiation of a word that either matched or did not 
match the prime that appeared before the target in a lexical decision task, and the other group 
subjected to both visual satiation and verbal satiation. Verbal satiation of the primes significantly 
increased reaction times in the lexical decision task for the target words that followed (Neely, 
1977a, p. 455). This implies that addition of verbal satiation of the primes further interrupted 
recognition processing and, consequently, amplified th  satiation effect. 
 This is echoed in James' original work on semantic satiation (1962). In this work, subjects 
were presented with a word for one second and were th n asked to verbally repeat that word for 
15 seconds thereafter. They were also instructed that the rate of repetition should be about 2-3 
repetitions per second and then rate the word on an i dex of meaningfulness. In contrast, one 
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control condition involved the initial word presentation and then 15 seconds they were instructed 
to wait to make a rating. The other control condition nvolved the subjects repeating  a word for 
15 seconds and then judging an alternate word using the scale. Results exhibited ratings closer to 
'meaningless' point on the scale when the subjects had to repeat the same word aloud that they 
would be judging (James, 1962). 
 The above studies support the idea that verbal repetitions can alter semantic accessibility. 
Having verbal regurgitation of the test cues may also lead to differential outcomes on an 
orthographic level due to the process engaging verbal generation rather than solely passive 
viewing to produce the exposure to the test cues. Given that Experiment 2 failed to find any effect 
of primes on familiarity or novelty ratings, the engagement of deeper cue processing in 
Experiment 3 might encourage semantic-level processing of the cue and thus increase the 
likelihood of finding an effect of the primes, such as the Jacoby-Whitehouse effect. Also, because 
other research has suggested that processing fluency may be driven or enhanced by the motor 
processes involved in overt pronunciation (e.g., Topolinski, 2012), there is additional reason to 
suspect that overt repetition might increase the likelihood of an over-saturation effect. 
Accordingly, the focused research questions that Experiment 3 was designed to address are: How 
will verbal repetition of nonword test cues affect feelings of novelty for those cues? In other 
words, will an oversaturation effect occur for test cues that are repeated thirty times versus only 
once? In addition, how will recollection for the graphemically similar study word be affected? 
 The paradigm employed in Experiment 3 was reformatted from that of Experiment 2 to 
include verbal repetition of test nonwords to see how this difference in task and modality would 
affect novelty ratings for nonword test cues and recognition of similar study items. Expectations 
were that incorporations of a phonological component into the experimental paradigm would lead 
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to different mechanisms employed within the task and, consequently, different patterns of data or 
would exacerbate existing patterns that were too weak to come through in the first experiment. 
Novelty ratings were expected to be higher for test cues which graphemically resembled study 
items but were verbally repeated multiple times versus only one time.  
Method 
Participants 
 Twelve Colorado State University undergraduate students were initially recruited from a 
Psy 459 Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory and offered extra credit for the course to participate 
in a pilot intended to test the whether the nonwords used in the experiment for the test cues were 
pronounceable. For the main study, eighty five Colorad  State University undergraduate students 
were recruited from the CSU Psychology Department subject pool and given course credit as a 
part of their introductory Psychology course requirements for participation in this study. Thirteen 
subjects were dropped due to incompletion of the experiment or program malfunctions during 
the course of the experiment, leaving 72 participants, 36 in the familiarity rating condition and 
36 in the novelty rating condition. Each participant in both the pilot and Experiment 3 identified 
as fluent in English and gave informed consent. Each subject ran through the study in an 
individual room with a researcher present.  
Materials   
 Pilot. The pilot materials were assembled with the same test cues that were used in 
Experiment 1 and that were consequently used in Experiment 2. These test cues were collected in 
an E-Prime program, which presented the cues one at a time in the upper left corner of the screen. 
Order of presentation was randomized. The duration that the cue was presented was controlled by 
the participant by pressing 'Enter' to move on to the next cue. 
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 Experiment 3. All stimuli were the same as that described in Experim nt 2 (the 192 
potential study words and  graphemically similar test cues used in Ryals and Cleary (2012)). 
Again, the stimuli were put together in an E-Prime program that was presented to participants. 
Study and test stimuli were separated into six study- est blocks for each participant, each 
containing 16 study words followed by 32 test cues. Half (16) of the test cues resembled study 
items and half (16) did not. Order of presentation of study and test stimuli were randomized 
within each block and block presentation was randomized. 
  Each study word was presented in the upper left corner of the computer screen for 2 s with 
a 1 s inter-stimulus interval. Each study list was immediately followed by the corresponding test 
list. Test nonwords appeared in the upper left corner of the computer screen and a repetition cue 
was presented in the center of the screen. Half of the test cues were accompanied by repetition 
cues that were the number 30, indicating that the subject should verbally say the nonword 30 
times. The remaining half of test cues were paired with the number 1 as the cue, indicating the 
subject should repeat the test nonword out loud only ce. The test cue remained on the screen for 
the duration of the verbal repetitions.  
Procedure  
 Pilot. An initial pilot was carried out before Experiment 3 o ensure that subjects would be 
able to say the nonwords aloud. For this pilot, each nonword was presented in the top left corner 
of the screen and the participant was instructed to say the nonword aloud when it appeared. The 
pilot was paced by the participant; the cue would remain on the screen until the participant pressed 
the 'Enter' key, at which point the next cue would appear. No judgments were made in the pilot, 
nor was there a study phase. 
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Experiment 3. Participants were greeted and given a consent form t  complete before 
beginning the experiment. Upon completion, each was escorted to an individual booth in which 
the E-Prime program was set up on the computer for the participant to begin. Experimenters were 
present in the room with the participant to ensure that the participant was making verbal 
responses. Responses were also recorded. Instructions were given on the screen and participants 
were to progress through the program by pressing 'enter . During study, the participants were 
instructed to pay attention to the words presented in the upper left corner of the screen and that a 
test would follow the study phase. 
 Familiarity rating condition. For each cue presented on the test, participants were first 
asked to use the repetition cue and to say that nonword test cue out loud for the number of times 
that the repetition cue indicated. Participants were instructed to press enter upon completion of the 
verbal repetitions of the nonword and, when they did so, a dialogue box appeared asking them 
first to provide a rating for 'feeling of familiarity' of the test cue itself. They were told that we 
would like them to indicate how familiar the test cue feels to them at the time of presentation. 
They were asked to rate the 'feeling of familiarity' using the scale of 0 (does not feel familiar) to 
10 (feels very familiar). Following the rating, participants were asked, ‘‘Do you recall a word 
from the study list that resembles this item? If so, type it in.’’ Participants were prompted to type 
the studied word into a dialog box. 
 Novelty rating condition. For each cue presented on the test, participants were first asked 
to use the repetition cue and to say that nonword test cue out loud for the number of times that the 
repetition cue indicated. Upon completion of the verbal repetitions of the test cue, participants 
were to press enter.  A dialogue box would appear at their key press asking them first to provide a 
rating for 'feeling of newness' of the test cue itslf. They were told that all of the test items are 
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non-words, so all are new, but that we would like th m to indicate how foreign that cue feels to 
them at the time of presentation. They were asked to rate the 'feeling of newness' using the scale 
of 0 (does not feel new) to 10 (feels very new). Following the rating, participants were asked, “Do 
you recall a word from the study list that resembles this item? If so, type it in.” Participants were 
prompted to type the studied word into a dialog box.    
Results 
Pilot Assessment 
 The verbal responses obtained from the 15 pilot subjects were observed at the time of 
collection by the researcher. If there were any of the nonword cues that a subject was not able to 
say out loud, the researcher would take note of it.Any nonwords that were particularly difficult 
for the subject to say were also recorded within each subjects' data. There were no cues among all 
15 pilot subjects which were unable to be vocalized. There were nonword cues that seemed to take 
longer than others, but the particular items varied among the subjects.  
Data Analyses   
 Typed identification responses were sorted and coded for identification status of the test 
stimuli. This was done by hand to ensure that any misspellings were correctly categorized. The 
mean number of items correctly identified for studied and non-studied items across all conditions 
and the mean familiarity and novelty ratings given to test cues for studied and non-studied items 
were calculated. 
 The recordings of verbal responses were listened to to make sure the participants were 
correctly following the instructions. They were asse ed for any instances in which the participant 
may not have said the cue aloud the correct number of times. Any other verbal discrepancies from 
the intended cue to be repeated or times that the resea cher had to intervene to correct or ensure 
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that the participants were saying the words and following direction were counted for each 
participant. 
The Recognition without Cued Recall (RWCR) Effect 
 Again for Experiment 3, we were primarily interested in ratings when recall failed. The 
recognition without cued-recall effect across both rating conditions (familiarity ratings and 
novelty ratings) was investigated through the use of a 2 (Rating Type: familiarity ratings vs 
novelty ratings) x 2 (Study Status: studied vs unstdied) repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). The effect of Rating Type was observed between subjects, Study Status was the 
within-subject variable and ratings were the dependent variable. This analysis revealed a main 
effect of Rating Type; familiarity ratings (M=2.51, SD=1.64) were lower in general than novelty 
ratings (M=7.08, SD=1.89), F(1,70)=127.14, p<.001, η2=.62.  
 The main effect of Study Status was not significant, with ratings across both rating types 
for test cues that resembled study items only slightly higher (M=4.82, SD=2.78) than for test cues 
that did not (M=4.70, SD=3.01), F(1,71)=1.26, p=.266, η2=.25. However, this lack of main effect 
was likely due to the fact that the Rating Type x Study Status interaction was significant such that 
the effect of Study Status depended on the type of rating being given, F(1,69)=10.81, p=.002, 
η
2=.48. As in Experiment 2, test cues that were orthographically similar to study items elicited 
significantly higher familiarity ratings (M=2.75, SD=1.68) than did test cues that did not resemble 
studied items (unstudied) (M=2.27, SD=1.58) among test cues for which no similar study items 
could be identified. As expected, the relationship within the novelty rating condition showed an 
effect of Study-Status in the opposite direction; orth graphically similar test cues led to lower 
novelty ratings (M=6.96, SD=1.94) than did dissimilar test cues (unstudied) (M=7.20, SD=1.85) 
among test items for which no similar study items could be identified (See Figure 15). 
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 The difference between ratings for studied and unstudied items were explored between 
rating conditions to further investigate the effects described above. The significant main effect of 
Rating Type along with the interaction suggest thatere may be a difference in the magnitude of 
the RWCR effect. Difference values were calculated in each rating condition between ratings 
assigned to studied cues and those assigned to unstudied cues and the absolute value was taken of 
each of these difference values (see Figure 16 for distributions). A t-test revealed that the 
difference in ratings of studied items and unstudied it ms in the familiarity rating condition 
(M=.62, SD=.50) was significantly larger than the difference in ratings of studied items and 
unstudied items in the novelty rating condition (M=.40, SD=.35), t(69)=2.18, p=.03. 
The Effects of Verbal Repetition 
The next sections separately examine how the familirity and novelty ratings were affected 
by the conditions of Repetition (repeated one time or 30 times). Familiarity and novelty ratings 
will be examined separately, starting with familiarty atings given during recall success then 
turning to familiarity ratings given during recall failure, followed by novelty ratings given during 
recall success then turning to novelty ratings given during recall failure.  
  Cue Familiarity Ratings During Recall Success. Familiarity ratings were analyzed 
among test cues that did lead to successful retrieval of a similar study item via a repeated 
measures 2 (Study Status: studied target vs. unstudied target) x 2 (Repetition Condition: one time 
vs 30 times) analysis of variance (ANOVA). This analysis yielded a significant effect of Study 
Status, whereby test cues that resembled study items r ceived higher familiarity ratings (M=8.48, 
SD=.89) than did test cues that did not resemble studied items (M=5.55, SD=2.03), F(1,35)=85.32, 
p<.001, η2=.71. No effect of Repetition Condition was observed, F(1,35)=.39, p=.54, η2=.011. The  
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interaction between Study Status and Repetition Conditi  also did not prove to be significant, 
F(1,35)=2.60, p=.12, η2=.068 (See Table 11, Figure 17).  
 Cue Familiarity Ratings During Recall Failure. To investigate how the number of times 
a subject said the test cue would factor in to the RWCR effect, familiarity ratings for test cues that 
resembled study items but were unable to be identifi d were compared across Repetition 
Condition. A 2 (Study Status: target studied vs target not studied) x 2 (Repetition Condition: 1 
time vs. 30 times) repeated measures ANOVA was performed examining familiarity ratings for 
test cues that did not lead to successful retrieval of  similar study item. The effect of Study Status 
was significant with test cues resembling study items showing higher familiarity ratings (M=2.75, 
SD=1.82) than test cues that were not orthograpically similar to a studied word (M=2.27, 
SD=1.61), F(1,35)=19.22, p<.001, η2=.354.  
 Similar to the findings of Experiment 2, no main effect of Repetition Condition was 
observed, F(1,35)=.87, p=.36, η2=.024, nor was an interaction between Study Status and number 
of repetitions, F(1,35)=0, p=.99, η2=0 (See Table 11, Figure 18).  
 Cue Novelty Ratings During Recall Success. Novelty ratings were analyzed among test 
cues that did lead to successful retrieval of a similar study item in a repeated measures 2 (Study 
Status: studied target vs. unstudied target) x 2 (Repetition Condition: 1 time vs 30 times) analysis 
of variance (ANOVA). From this, a significant effect of Study Status was observed, by which test 
cues that resembled study items received lower novelty ratings (M=4.25, SD=2.53) than did test 
cues that did not resemble studied items (M=4.99, SD=2.50), F(1,35)=12.77, p=.001, η2=.267.  
 The effect of Repetition Condition was not found to be significant, F(1,35)=.84, p=.37, 
η
2=.023, although, in each study condition, the means were slightly higher when the cues were 
repeated 30 times (Studied: M=4.33, SD=2.56; Unstudied: M=5.09, SD=2.60) versus only once 
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(Studied: M=4.18, SD=2.50; Unstudied: M=4.88, SD=2.40). Finally, no interaction effect was 
observed between Study Status and Repetition Conditi , F(1,35)=.06, p=.82, η2=.002 (See Table 
12, Figure 19).   
Cue Novelty Rating During Recall Failure. A 2 (Study Status: target studied vs target 
unstudied) x 2 (Repetition Condition: one time vs. 30 times) repeated measures ANOVA was 
performed to explore novelty ratings for test cues that did not lead to successful retrieval of a 
similar study item. The effect of Study Status was found to be significant; test cues that resembled 
study items elicited lower novelty ratings (M=6.96, SD=1.94) than did dissimilar test cues 
(unstudied) (M=7.20, SD=1.85).  
 No significant effect was found for Repetition Condition, F(1,35)=0, p=.99, η2=0; 
however, the interaction between Study Status and Repetition Condition approached significance, 
F(1,35)=3.34, p=.076, η2=.087. This interaction can be observed in the means; test cues that 
resembled studied items and were said aloud only once (M=6.97, SD=1.95) had lower novelty 
ratings assigned to them than test cues that resembled studied items and were repeated 30 times 
(M=7.09, SD=2.11), whereas test cues that did not resemble items from study said once (M=7.34, 
SD=1.82) had slightly higher novelty ratings assigned to them than test cues in this condition that 
were repeated 30 times (M=7.21, SD=2.08) (See Table 12, Figure 20). 
Successful Recall Proportions  
 Identification proportions within each independent variable condition were calculated. A 2 
(Rating Type: familiarity ratings vs. novelty ratings) x 2 (Study Status: target studied vs. target 
unstudied) x 2 (Repetition Condition: one time vs. 30 times) repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted to analyze the proportion of study items the participants were able to identify across 
each of these conditions. The effect of Rating Type was significant; higher proportions of correct 
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target identifications were observed in the familiarity rating scale (M=.42, SD=.22) than in the 
novelty rating scale condition (M=.39, SD=.22), F(1,70)=5.00, p=.03, η2=.722. Additionally, there 
was an effect of Study Status whereby higher proportions of correct target identifications were 
observed when test cues resembled studied items (M=.57, SD=.16) than when test cues did not 
resemble items from the study list (M=.24, SD=.14), F(1,70)=376.00, p<.001, η2=.801.  
 No significant differences in identification proporti ns were found between repetition 
conditions (one time vs 30 times) overall, F(1,70)=0, p=.99, η2=0, and no interactions among any 
of the variables were found in this global analysis [Rating Condition x Study Status: F(1,70)=1.01 
p=.32, η2=.002; Rating Type x Repetition Condition: F(1,70)=.50, p=.48, η2=.004; Study Status x 
Repetition Condition: F(1,70)=0, p=.99, η2=0; Study Status x Rating Type x Repetition Condition: 
F(1,70)=0, p=.99, η2=0]. However, to explore the main effect of Rating Type in more depth, the 
proportions of correct identifications were analyzed in each of the rating scales separately. 
 Analysis of the identification proportions within the familiarity rating condition revealed 
only a main effect of Study Status, F(1,35)=229.45, p<.001, η2=.87. Test cues that resembled 
words from the study list more often led to correct identifications of the study words (M=.59, 
SD=.14) than did test cues unlike any study words (M=.25, SD=.14). No effects were observed for 
the repetition variable, F(1,35)=.87, p=.36, η2=.024, nor the interaction between Study Status and 
Repetition Condition, F(1,164)=10.14, p=.002, η2=.058 (See Table 13, Figure 21). 
 Different patterns of results were observed when t identification proportions were 
analyzed among conditions within the novelty rating condition. Overall, test cues which were said 
aloud only once less often led to identifications of the corresponding study words (M=.39, 
SD=.16) than did test cues that were repeated aloud 30 times (M=.50, SD=.17), F(1,35)=19.89, 
p<.001, η2=.37. Likewise, test cues that were orthographically similar to a presented study word 
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led to significantly more identification proportions (M=.54, SD=.17) than did test cues with no 
study word similarities (M=.35, SD=.16), F(1,35)=24.49, p<.001, η2=.42. The interaction between 
study status and repetition condition was also significant, F(1,35)=21.22, p<.001, η2=.38, showing 
that identification proportions across conditions of repetition were similar when test cues 
resembled studied words (1x: M=.54, SD=.18; 30x: M=.54, SD=.17), but conversely, differed 
when test cues did not resemble any studied words (1x: M=.24, SD=.15; 30x: M=.45, SD=.17). 
Identification proportions were higher within this condition when the subjects repeated the test 
cues thirty times (See Table 13, Figure 22). 
Discussion 
The Recognition without Cued Recall (RWCR) Effect 
 Again for Experiment 3, the standard recognition without cued recall effect emerges in the 
familiarity rating condition, showing that test cues that resembled study items were given higher 
familiarity ratings than test cues that did not resemble study items. With novelty ratings, the 
reverse of this relationship was found; test cues that resembled study items were given lower 
novelty ratings than test cues that did not resembl study items. When analysis was done into the 
magnitude of the effect in each rating condition, however, again we found that the (reverse?) 
RWCR effect was significantly smaller in the novelty rating condition than in the familiarity 
rating condition. Novelty ratings do not display as much of a distinction between studied and 
unstudied items as familiarity ratings do. 
 These findings match those in the second experiment, which suggests that these effects 
persist across modalities of test cue presentation. H wever, both experiments included visual 
presentation and for Experiment 3, verbal repetitions were only a secondary form of test cue 
presentation, so it is possible that the observed eff cts were due solely to the visual presentation of 
 65
those test cues. Despite the inability to bridge these findings to other sensory modalities, the 
findings do provide further support for the relationship between novelty ratings and familiarity 
ratings. The pattern of higher ratings assigned to studied items and lower ratings given to 
unstudied items in the familiarity rating condition is reversed in the novelty rating condition where 
lower ratings are ascribed to studied items and higher ratings to unstudied items, however, the 
degree of the difference between ratings assigned to studied items and those assigned to unstudied 
items is different between the two rating conditions.  
The Effect of Verbal Repetition on Cue Familiarity and Novelty Ratings 
 Familiarity Ratings. In the presence of recall we only see an effect of s udy status; test 
cues that resembled studied items were given higher familiarity ratings than test cues that did not 
resemble any words presented at study. The number of r petitions of the nonword test cues had 
relatively no effect when cues gave rise to correct identifications of the study words. This same 
pattern of results is observed when subjects are not able to correctly identify a study word that 
corresponds to the test cue presented; test cues that resembled study words were still given higher 
familiarity ratings than test cues that had no similar study word presented. This, again, is the 
standard RWCR effect that we had expected to observe. 
 Of interest here is that the number of times the subject was instructed to repeat the 
nonword test cues seemingly had no effect on the familiarity of those cues. This would suggest 
that the number of verbal repetitions does not leadto a habituation effect as is described in the 
semantic satiation literature as well as is proposed in Huber's and colleagues (2008) fluency-
disfluency model. To see this, the data would have shown lower familiarity ratings to test cues 
that had been repeated 30 times and familiarity ratings higher, similar to those when the subject 
just views the cues, in the conditions in which the participants had to only say the test cue aloud 
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once. It is possible, like in Experiment 2, that this abituation can not be reached driven by 
orthographic features alone. This thought will be explored further in the general discussion that 
follows. 
 Novelty Ratings. In all identification conditions, test cues that resembled studied items led 
to lower novelty ratings than did test cues that did not share orthographic features with a word that 
had been presented at study. This could be considered a eversed RWCR effect and had been 
expected considering the reliable effect that persists within familiarity ratings. These findings, and 
those that show no difference among the number of times the cue is repeated, are consistent with 
the results of the second experiment.   
 The interaction that is observed between Study Status nd Repetition Condition when 
study items resembling test cues are not identified s interesting (although it did not reach 
statistical significance). It could be that when the est cue does not resemble a word from the study 
list, the repetitions allow the subjects to generate other words from their general knowledge that 
do share features with the test cue, leading them to judge that cue as less new. Alternately, when a 
similar word had been presented in the study phase, perhaps the increased repetitions of the cue do 
lead to a saturation effect of those features which results in a higher novelty rating. A different 
trend was found when the corresponding study items were recalled from the test cue; whether the 
cue resembled a study item or not, the novelty ratings were higher for cues repeated 30 times. The 
effect size in both conditions was relatively small, however. It would be interesting to explore this 
in a follow up experiment with more participants to increase power.  
Successful Recall Proportions 
 Overall, the rating scale used to make judgments (familiarity or novelty) affected the 
proportion of study items that were correctly recalled. A deeper inspection exposed that the 
 67
difference driving the effect was primarily due to proportions within the familiarity rating 
condition being relatively stable across the repetition conditions while a difference emerged in the 
proportions within the novelty rating condition. Whet er a test cue corresponded with a study 
word was not affected by the number of study words that were successfully recalled no matter the 
rating scale utilized; when test cues orthographically matched a study word, they were more likely 
to be correctly identified. However, subjects were more likely to identify the study word that 
orthographically matched the presented test cue, although the study word was not included in their 
study list (correct guesses), after repeating the cue 30 times. Fewer correct guesses were made 
when the test cue was only said aloud once. This effect was also observed in Experiment 2, 
although to a lesser degree.  
 Because this phenomenon is observed in both experiments, it seems that it is an effect of 
the rating scale (as it is not observed in the famili rity rating scale condition), but it also seems 
that verbal repetition may exacerbate the effect. It may be related to the finding discussed above, 
in the 'Novelty Ratings' section, of novelty ratings being lower for cues that do not resemble a 
word from the study list repeated 30 times, versus only once, when study items resembling test 
cues are not identified. It is possible that this condition (novelty ratings given to cues repeated 30 
times) provokes lower ratings because the ability to come up with or internally generate a similar 
word to the test cue makes the test cue seem less new.  
Limitations 
 One major limitation in this experiment was that the pace of the repetitions was not 
dictated by the experiment instructions. This resulted in a high degree of variability of pace across 
participants. It was observed in the audio data that some participants were much faster at saying 
the cues and some were much slower. This was also evident in the time it took participants to 
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complete the experiment; some were complete in an hour and 15 minutes, while others struggled 
to complete within the 2 hour allotment. This variability could affect the way that each individual 
processed the stimuli and could have altered the effect. This also led to having to drop a number 
of subjects that were not able to complete the experiment.  
 Additionally, as in the previous experiments, ratings were driven by a low number of items 
in some of the experimental conditions. This occurs by nature of the paradigm used because one 
of the variables (identification status) can only be determined after the experiment is ran through 
coding of each participants data. This can lead to very few items actually leading to the mean 







 This study sought to address two general questions with respect to the sense of novelty. 
The first question was: How will novelty ratings compare to familiarity ratings? Much research 
has considered novelty only as the inverse of famili rity (Rinkus, 2010). This view suggests that, 
in the case of subjective ratings, a cue that feels v ry familiar would not feel very new and vice 
versa, and if asked to give the two different types of ratings (cue familiarity vs. cue novelty 
ratings), the patterns should be the inverse of one another. Specifically, the degree of familiarity 
elicited by a stimulus should be the inverse of the degree of novelty felt upon presentation of that 
same stimulus and that any factors that would influence one would similarly influence the other. 
The second general question that was asked was: Will repetition priming of the test cue itself 
change how that cue is experienced in terms of its elicited level of familiarity and novelty? 
 To address the first question (that of whether novelty is the inverse of familiarity), the 
results suggest that it is not. Although both Experim nts 2 and 3 demonstrate that cues resembling 
studied items were rated higher in familiarity and lower in novelty than cues not resembling 
studied items, the magnitude of the resemblance effect differed depending on the type of rating 
being given. The magnitude of the cue resemblance effect was smaller when cue novelty ratings 
were given than when cue familiarity ratings were given. This pattern suggests that cue novelty 
ratings are not simply the inverse of cue familiarity atings. There appears to be something 
different being invoked for judgments of novelty than for judgments of familiarity.  
 Further evidence for the idea that novelty ratings i voke other processes than do 
familiarity ratings is the finding that correct target guessing rates were higher among participants 
assigned to the novelty rating condition than among participants assigned to the familiarity rating 
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condition. This pattern was shown in both Experiments 2 and 3 and was not predicted. However, 
the pattern suggests that orienting participants toward cue novelty judgments may prompt them to 
search harder for the target word in memory. Why should participants be more compelled to 
search memory for potential targets when oriented toward cue novelty than when oriented toward 
cue familiarity? One possibility is that being orient d toward novelty increases guessing attempts. 
However, a close examination of the response rates in both experiments did not consistently 
support this hypothesis. Participants in Experiment 2 i deed responded more often in the novelty 
ratings condition than in the familiarity ratings condition (t(163)=-1.99, p=.048), however, the 
opposite was found in Experiment 3 (See Table 15). This variability in response rates between 
experiments could be related to the trend for a repetition effect in Experiment 3 that is absent in 
Experiment 2.  
 Alternatively, the differences we see in ratings for orthographically similar cues across 
rating type might be explained by research that has investigated associative novelty in more depth. 
Kumaran and Maguire (2007) suggest that stimulus novelty and associative novelty may rely on 
different neural subsystems. While past studies suggest that stimulus novelty is detected and 
processed by the perirhinal cortex via a familiarity mechanism (Aggleton & Brown, 2006; Brown 
& Bashir, 2002; Viskontas et al., 2006), it is likely that associative novelty is detected and 
processed via a comparator mechanism taking place in the hippocampus (Kumaran & Maguire, 
2007; Viskontas et al., 2006).  
 The distinction between these two computational mechanisms is as follows: Familiarity 
mechanisms operate by a familiarity/novelty discrimination system. When a stimulus is presented, 
a global matching process ensues and degree of match be ween it and other representations stored 
in memory creates a familiarity signal; the higher the degree of match, the higher the familiarity 
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signal (Kumaran & Maguire, 2007; Norman & O'Reilly, 2003). This is the mechanism that is 
largely agreed to be the mechanism of novelty detection in the perirhinal cortex. The perirhinal 
cortex is also thought to work on a response reduction model; with each subsequent stimulus 
exposure, less perirhinal activation occurs and higher familiarity (Kumaran & Maguire, 2007).  
 The comparative model, on the other hand, suggests that the hippocampus (and 
specifically, the CA1 region) operates by means of comparing sensory information coming from 
the entorhinal cortex with information about prior experience (from CA3), coding mismatches 
between the two sources of input.  In this perspectiv , he hippocampus is not involved directly in 
coding for novelty (this is handled upstream in the perirhinal cortex) but is primarily concerned 
with the context of a presented stimulus (Honey et al., 1998; Kumaran & Maguire, 2007). The 
increased activity in the hippocampus, then, in respon e to novel stimuli is a reflection of the 
bonding of stimulus to context in formation of new memory representations (Honey et al., 1998; 
Kumaran & Maguire, 2007).  
 A major difference between these two models is that recollection is not called upon or 
needed to make a familiarity/novelty distinction in the familiarity mechanism but is in the 
comparator mechanism in order to retrieve stored patterns (Kumaran & Maguire, 2007). This 
means that associative novelty decisions rely on recall of contextual details of a representation. 
Consequently, the difference in degree of rating difference between studied and unstudied items in 
novelty ratings compared to this difference in familiarity ratings may be due to the contribution of 
recollection processes in making the rating judgment in the case of novelty ratings. It may be the 
nature of novelty judgments themselves that then is dependent upon some degree of recollection 
as well as familiarity. 
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 Regarding the second aforementioned question (will repetition priming of the test cue itself 
change how that cue is experienced in terms of its elicited level of familiarity and novelty?), 
results of both the second and third experiments suggest that amount of exposure to the test cue 
itself (through prime duration in Experiment 2 and through overt repetitions in Experiment 3) did 
not significantly affect the ratings for those cues, neither in the familiarity rating condition, nor the 
novelty rating condition. However, a trend did emerge in Experiment 3, hinting at an interaction 
between study status and repetition condition when novelty ratings were used. As I discuss above, 
this trend may be related to the phenomenon of a higher number of correct guesses in the novelty 
rating condition, especially in Experiment 3 when the cues were repeated 30 times. The ideas here 
are that use of the novelty rating scale encourages  r trieval process, whereby any words that 
share orthographic features with the test cue are gen rated. This hypothesis is consistent with that 
put forth above that this paradigm has tapped associative novelty and that this type of novelty 
requires the input of recollection in that stored patterns must be retrieved for comparison. 
 An alternative explanation for the amount of the exposure to the cues having no to little 
effect on the ratings assigned to them could be that the shared orthographic features are not salient 
enough to produce the types of effects we see with semantic, lexical, and perceptual stimuli 
(James, 1962; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Moulin, ; Neely, 1976, 1977a, 1977b). Not only were 
no habituation-type responses observed following high exposure to the cues, but no facilitative 
memory effects were observed either after brief presentation of the test cues. Evidence of the 
uniqueness of this paradigm is demonstrated in the data. For instance, overall, novelty ratings 
were higher than familiarity ratings, meaning that the scales were used slightly different 
depending on the rating type. This could be an effect of the cues used, as none were actually  
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studied (and only shared orthographic features withthe words that were), they may always feel 
more novel.  
  Additionally, the fact that the Jacoby-Whitehouse eff ct was consistently absent in the 
RWCR paradigm is possibly a theoretically interesting finding in and of itself. This is because one 
potential explanation for what drives cue familiarity detection during recall failure (i.e., the 
RWCR effect) is the fluency with which the cue is processed. It is conceivable that a non-word 
cue that overlaps in orthographic features with a studied item is processed more fluently than a 
non-word cue that does not overlap in features withany studied item. If such cue fluency drives 
the discrimination between cues resembling and not resembling studied words that characterizes 
RWCR, then one would expect the type of priming of the cue that was performed in the present 
study to exert an effect. Specifically, the bias that characterizes the Jacoby-Whitehouse effect 
should emerge. The fact that this bias does not emerge suggests that perhaps the fluency of the test 
cue is not what drives the RWCR effect. Specifically, because participants are not relying on cue 
fluency, they discard or ignore the increase in cue fluency that is presumably brought on by the 
immediate priming of the cue. 
 A reexamination of the relationship of orthographic cues within existing models of 
knowledge representation may be needed. A start to this may, in fact, already have been done. A 
recent study by Tian and Huber (2013) examined semantic satiation through a connectivity 
reduction perspective. This is a neural network approach that suggests that neural responses to 
repeated items are reduced to focus on processing of ovel items. Magnetoencephalography 
(MEG) responses were measured and connection efficiency between cortical regions was assessed 
during a category matching task that involved one cat gory header repeating numerous times 
while the others presented were each only presented once. They ultimately observed reduced 
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connectivity between the visual word form area, related to processing of orthography, and the left 
middle temporal lobe, related to lexical and semantic processing, when category headers were 
repeated. They concluded that semantic satiation is due to connectivity reduction between 
semantic and orthographic levels. If it is this disconnect that leads to a semantic habituation effect, 
how might overexposure to orthographic features relate to semantic satiation? Perceptual 
habituation? Perhaps these problems too can be thought f in a connectivity reduction view and 
future studies may provide answers as to the configuration and strength of relationships between 
these factors. 
Overall Limitations 
 The major source of limitations from the two experiments is the uncertainty regarding why 
there was a failure to find the Jacoby-Whitehouse effect in this paradigm (whereby test items 
primed with rapid-duration matching primes tend to be judged as more likely to have been 
studied). It is possible that those types of test it m priming effects are simply too weak to detect in 
this paradigm because those processes are overshadowed by the processes that drive the 
recognition without cued recall effect. It is also p ssible that when all of the test items are known 
to be novel, the attribution from priming is not made. Additionally, because of the complexity of 
the design, the variable of amount of exposure to the test cue (prime duration in Experiment 1 and 
2, and repetition condition in Experiment 3) was kept at two conditions, short duration (or 1 
repetition in Experiment 3) and long duration (30 repetitions). With more levels of this variable, it 
is possible that a different relationship would have been revealed in the data and we would have 
seen the degree to which exposure can affect subjective judgments. A limitation is that 
explanations for the failure to find the Jacoby-White ouse effect in the RWCR paradigm are only 
speculative at this time.  
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 The effect observed in the pilot study (Experiment 1) of lower familiarity ratings for test 
cues paired with mismatched long duration primes compared to those of all other prime conditions 
was also not observed in either of the following two experiments; in short, that pattern did not 
replicate and thus was unreliable. While it is possible that unknown differences between the 
procedures may have led to these very different results between Experiments 1 and 2, it is also 
possible that the priming pattern found in Experiment 1 was simply a fluke and that is why it did 
not replicate in Experiment 2.  
Future Directions 
 This set of experiments set the groundwork for future studies with hopes of using novelty 
ratings. Using novelty ratings to explore amount of exposure to features on various levels of 
memory representations (perceptual, orthographical, lexical, semantic) may provide insight into 
how these are all related and as to how novelty specifically is affected. It is also possible that 
different representation levels tap different types of novelty that might function in different ways 
than what we have observed in these experiments on the orthographic level.  
 Attempts to induce fluency and disfluency while using novelty ratings should also be made 
attempting to reconcile past literatures with the results found here. It is possible that amount of 
exposure is not the only factor that can influence a f eling of novelty. Perhaps oversaturation to 
feature or concept representations can be caused by other factors. One possible factor may be 
depth of processing or quality. Also, what type or types of novelty are working in experiences of 
jamais vu and deja vu? Follow up experiments should seek to address these issues and inquiries 




Table 1. Experiment 1 – Mean identification proportion of study targets as a function of Study 
Status, Prime Match Status, and Prime Duration 
 Studied  Unstudied 
Prime Duration Matching Primes Mismatched 
Primes 
 Matching Primes Mismatched 
Primes 
50ms .66 (.16) .70 (.20)  .23 (.14) .21 (.13) 
1000ms .65 (.18) .61 (.22)  .20 (.13) .20 (.12) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Identified unstudied items are unstudied 








































Table 2. Experiment 1 – Identified Targets - Mean familiarity ratings for test items as a function 
of Study Status, Prime Match Status, and Prime Duration 
 Studied  Unstudied 
Prime 
Duration 
Matching Primes Mismatched 
Primes 
 Matching Primes Mismatched 
Primes 
50ms 8.75 (1.08) 8.65 (1.17)  5.66 (1.89) 5.53 (1.97) 
1000ms 8.59 (1.15) 8.69 (.97)  5.59 (2.18) 5.64 (2.09) 








































Table 3. Experiment 1 – Unidentified Targets - Mean familiarity ratings for test items as a 
function of Study Status, Prime Match Status, and Prime Duration 
 Studied  Unstudied 
Prime Duration Matching Primes Mismatched 
Primes 
 Matching Primes Mismatched 
Primes 
50ms 3.44 (2.01) 3.14 (1.83)  1.98 (1.35) 1.98 (1.40) 
1000ms 3.45 (1.99) 1.98 (1.40)  2.07 (1.42) 1.95 (1.24) 



































Table 4. Experiment 2: Identified Targets -Mean familiarity ratings for test items as a function 
of Study Status, Prime Match Status, and Prime Duration 
 Studied  Unstudied 
Prime Duration Matching Primes Mismatched 
Primes 
 Matching Primes Mismatched 
Primes 
50ms 8.87 (.86) 8.97 (.81)  5.26 (2.90) 5.26 (2.63) 
1000ms 8.77 (.84) 8.71 (1.02)  5.15 (2.48) 5.16 (2.53) 








































Table 5. Experiment 2: Unidentified Targets -Mean familiarity ratings for test items as a 
function of Study Status, Prime Match Status, and Prime Duration 
 Studied  Unstudied 
Prime Duration Matching Primes Mismatched 
Primes 
 Matching Primes Mismatched 
Primes 
50ms 3.34 (1.77) 3.73 (2.11)  2.28 (1.35) 2.28 (1.40) 
1000ms 3.45 (1.75) 3.50 (1.99)  2.30 (1.40) 2.26 (1.43) 



































Table 6. Experiment 2: Identified Targets - Mean novelty ratings for test items as a function of 
Study Status, Prime Match Status, and Prime Duration 
 Studied  Unstudied 
Prime Duration Matching Primes Mismatched 
Primes 
 Matching Primes Mismatched 
Primes 
50ms 2.18 (1.58) 2.24 (1.66)  3.45 (2.15) 3.79 (2.45) 
1000ms 2.19 (1.57) 2.33 (1.57)  3.57 (2.00) 3.63 (2.22) 









































Table 7. Experiment 2: Unidentified Targets -Mean novelty ratings for test items as a function 
of Study Status, Prime Match Status, and Prime Duration 
 Studied  Unstudied 
Prime Duration Matching Primes Mismatched 
Primes 
 Matching Primes Mismatched 
Primes 
50ms 6.42 (1.91) 6.45 (1.83)  7.00 (1.65) 7.06 (1.68) 
1000ms 6.62 (1.70) 6.62 (1.81)  7.00 (1.56) 7.13 (1.70) 



































Table 8. Experiment 2: Mean identification proportion of study targets as a function of Study 
Status, Prime Match Status, and Prime Duration in the Familiarity Rating condition 
 Studied  Unstudied 
Prime Duration Matching Primes Mismatched 
Primes 
 Matching Primes Mismatched 
Primes 
50ms .67 (.17) .67 (.18)  .20 (.14) .21 (.15) 
1000ms .68 (.16) .66 (.17)  .20 (.14) .20 (.13) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Identified unstudied items are unstudied 








































Table 9. Experiment 2: Mean identification proportion of study targets as a function of Study 
Status, Prime Match Status, and Prime Duration in the Novelty Rating condition 
 Studied  Unstudied 
Prime 
Duration 
Matching Primes Mismatched 
Primes 
 Matching Primes Mismatched 
Primes 
50ms .68 (.16) .67 (.14)  .26 (.16) .27 (.19) 
1000ms .67 (.16) .65 (.16)  .28 (.17) .26 (.17) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Identified unstudied items are unstudied 








































Table 10. Experiment 2:  Mean number of items across participants that contributed to ratings in 
each condition  
 Familiarity  Novelty 
Identified Mean Range  Mean Range 
Studied Match 50ms 16.34 6-28  16.33 7-28 
Studied Match 1000ms 16.49 6-27  16.48 7-29 
Studied Mismatch 50ms 16.56 5-27  16.41 8-28 
Studied Mismatch 1000ms 16.11 8-26  15.87 7-26 
Unstudied Match 50ms 5.00 0-13  6.41 0-15 
Unstudied Match 1000ms 4.71 0-14  6.83 0-16 
Unstudied Mismatch 50ms 5.03 0-13  6.33 0-19 
Unstudied Mismatch 
1000ms 
4.84 0-14  6.41 0-17 
      
Unidentified      
Studied Match 50ms 7.47 0-16  7.47 1-17 
Studied Match 1000ms 7.46 1-18  7.53 2-16 
Studied Mismatch 50ms 7.49 1-18  7.76 2-16 
Studied Mismatch 1000ms 8.08 1-20  8.17 2-16 
Unstudied Match 50ms 19.19 11-30  17.80 8-31 
Unstudied Match 1000ms 19.34 9-30  17.16 8-29 
Unstudied Mismatch 50ms 18.92 7-29  17.51 5-29 
Unstudied Mismatch 
1000ms 


















Table 11. Experiment 3: Mean familiarity ratings for test items as a function of Identification 
Status, Study Status, and Repetition Condition 
 Identified  Unidentified 
Repetitions Studied Unstudied  Studied Unstudied 
1x 8.52 (.89) 5.43 (2.03)  2.68 (1.75) 2.21 (1.62) 
30x 8.43 (.90) 5.67 (2.03)  2.82 (1.88) 2.34 (1.61) 



































Table 12. Experiment 3: Mean novelty ratings for test items as a function of Identification 
Status, Study Status, and Repetition Condition 
 Identified  Unidentified 
Repetitions Studied Unstudied  Studied Unstudied 
1x 4.01 (2.32) 4.74 (2.26)  6.87 (1.91) 7.26 (1.79) 
30x 4.18 (2.43) 4.95 (2.50)  7.02 (2.10) 7.13 (2.05) 




































Table 13. Experiment 3: Mean identification proportion of study targets as a function of Rating 
Type, Study Status, and Repetition Condition 
 Familiarity  Novelty 
Repetitions Studied Unstudied  Studied Unstudied 
1x .59 (.14) .24 (.14)  .54 (.18) .24 (.15) 
30x .59 (.15) .26 (.14)  .54 (.17) .46 (.17) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Identified unstudied items are unstudied 








































Table 14. Experiment 3:  Mean number of items across participants that contributed to ratings in 
each condition  
 Familiarity  Novelty 
Identified Mean Range  Mean Range 
Studied Repeated 1x 16.34 6-28  16.33 7-28 
Studied Repeated 30x 16.49 6-27  16.48 7-29 
Unstudied Repeated 1x 5.00 0-13  6.41 0-15 
Unstudied Repeated 30x 4.71 0-14  6.83 0-16 
      
Unidentified      
Studied Repeated 1x 19.39 9-37  22.34 9-44 
Studied Repeated 30x 19.33 8-31  21.60 10-46 
Unstudied Repeated 1x 36.33 17-49  35.63 22-48 































Table 15. Mean number of identification responses made across Rating Type in Experiments 2 
and 3 
Experiment 2  Experiment 3 
Familiarity Novelty  Familiarity Novelty 
101.18 (23.59) 109.74 (30.82)  101.26 (30.51) 90.06 (34.55) 

















































































Figure 2. Experiment 1 – Study word identification proportions across all conditions of Study 






























































Figure 4. Experiment 1 - Familiarity ratings for test cues among items for which a similar study 
item was not identified, showing the RWCR effect of higher familiarity ratings for items that had 











































Figure 5. Experiment 1 - Familiarity ratings for test cues for which corresponding study items 



















































Figure 6. Experiment 1 - Familiarity ratings for test cues for which corresponding study items 














































Figure 7. Experiment 2 - Familiarity ratings for test cues among items for which a similar study 
item was not identified, showing the RWCR effect of higher familiarity ratings for items that had 
a graphemically similar word presented at study. Novelty ratings show a reversed RWCR effect of 





























Figure 8. Experiment 2 - Mean distribution of difference values (ratings for test cues resembling 




Figure 9. Experiment 2 - Familiarity ratings for test cues for which corresponding study items 
















































Figure 10. Experiment 2 - Familiarity ratings for test cues for which corresponding study items 
































































































Figure 12. Experiment 2 - Novelty ratings for test cues for which corresponding study items 














































Figure 13. Experiment 2 – Study word identification proportions across all conditions of Study 



























































Figure 14. Experiment 2 – Study word identification proportions across all conditions of Study 





















































Figure 15. Experiment 3 - Familiarity ratings for test cues among items for which a similar study 
item was not identified, showing the RWCR effect of higher familiarity ratings for items that had 
a graphemically similar word presented at study. Novelty ratings show lower novelty ratings for 





























Figure 16. Experiment 3 - Mean distribution of difference values across rating ype. 
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Figure 17. Experiment 3 - Familiarity ratings for test cues for which corresponding study items 
















































Figure 18. Experiment 3 - Familiarity ratings for test cues for which corresponding study items 














































































Figure 20. Experiment 3 - Novelty ratings for test cues for which corresponding study items 










































Figure 21. Experiment 3 – Study word identification proportions across all conditions of Study 












































Figure 22. Experiment 3 – Study word identification proportions across all conditions of Study 
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